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I. INTRODUCTION
Schedules of professional fees can either help or hinder the cause
of cost containment in medical care. On the one hand, fee schedules are
a form of price fixing, potentially vulnerable to attack under the Sher-
man Act as depriving the public of the benefits of price competition.
On the other hand, fee schedules may limit the prices which providers
of health care may charge for their services in a market made noncom-
petitive by the presence of health insurance. This Article discusses fee
schedules and their relation to other cost containment strategies avail-
able in the private sector. It argues that insurer-imposed fee schedules,
when used in combination with utilization review and closed-panel de-
livery models, can be effective in combating the price escalation that
now plagues the third party payment system.
This Article also argues that the Sherman Act does not proscribe
the use of fee schedules by commercial insurance companies as a
means of obtaining cost control. The analysis covers the applicability to
insurer-initiated fee schedules of the antitrust exception for "ancillary"
restraints of trade, drawing upon the analogous antitrust experience
with prepaid pharmaceutical and legal service plans, and the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exemption for "the business of insur-
ance."' Fee schedules employed by commercial carriers are contrasted
with the less defensible "usual, customary and reasonable fee" ap-
proach traditionally employed by Blue Shield service plans. This Arti-
cle concludes that maximum fee schedules, including the use of relative
value scales imposed by insurers to control costs, are legal so long as
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
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they are structured to prevent providers of care from using them as a
device for fixing prices. In addition, a type of fee schedule, the relative
value scale,2 is examined. Relative value scales, which have been used
for some time by the medical profession and insurers, describe the nu-
merical relationship between the values of different services as they are
actually being charged by the professional community.' The schedule
measures relative value, not price; no price is determined until the
practitioner applies his own charge multiplier, or "conversion factor,"
to the relative value index number stated.'
II. FEE SCHEDULES AND THE COST CONTAINMENT PROBLEM
A. The Failure of Market Incentives.
The customary practice in the medical industry is for doctors and
hospitals to submit bills and for insurance companies to pay them.5
Health care costs are rising precipitously because under this customary
practice there are no incentives for restraint. Doctors, knowing that
they will be paid what they charge, have no incentive to control the
amount and the price of services.7 Insured patients are ineffective in
limiting the care they receive; aside from usually insignificant deduct-
ibles and coinsurance obligations under their policies, all care is essen-
tially "free" from their perspective.8 In the long run, of course, insureds
2. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 1969 RELATIVE VALUE STUDIES. See
also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLUE SHIELD PLANS, BLUE SHIELD PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
INDEX (1964).
3. See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 3, 6; Carlova, The.4ttack on
RVS.A,4 Step Closer to Fee Control, MED. ECON., April 19, 1976, at 31, 35.
4. See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 7, 119; Blaine, A Relative
Value Index for Lawyer's Services, 53 ILL. B.J. 1006, 1007-09 (1965).
5. See Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certfcate of Need," 59
VA. L. REv. 1143, 1157 (1973).
6. HEW PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FORWARD PLAN FOR HEALTH FY 1978-1982,34 (1976);
Posner, RegulatoryAspects of National Health Insurance Plans, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1971). It
has been noted that "[w]ith an estimated 80-90 percent of Americans having at least some public
or private health insurance, and well over half rather comprehensively covered, the medical care
system has almost a blank check for its services.' McClure, The Medical Care System under Na-
tional Health Insurance: Four Models, 1 J. HEALTH POL., Poi'Y & L. 22, 33-34 (1976); see New-
house & Taylor, How Shall We Payfor Hospital Care, 23 PUB. INTEREST 78, 80-83 (1971). See
also KIuZAY & WILSON 111-15; Feldstein, The MedicalEconomy, SCIENTIFIC AM., Sept. 1973, at
151, 153-55.
7. See Reinhardt, Alternative Methods of Reimbursing Non-institutionalProviders of Health
Services, in CONFERENCE ON REGULATION IN THE HEALTH INDUSTRY OF THE INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROLS ON HEALTH CARE 139, 148-49
(1975).
8. "IT]he current type of costly medical care does not correspond to what consumers (and
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do pay for this care through higher premiums, but it is irrational for
any given patient to refrain from drawing on the collective fund at the
moment the utilization decision is made, especially when nothing pre-
vents others from exploiting the insurance fund.
Under the present system, only the third party payor has any im-
mediate incentive to control costs.9 Since it must meet all charges from
a premium pool that is fixed in advance, the third party stands to gain
as those charges are kept down. Insurers, however, have not responded
to this incentive.10 Instead, commercial insurers have acquiesced in
health care cost inflation by simply increasing premiums to meet ex-
pected increases in costs. Competition has not induced different behav-
ior.
Cost control can be introduced into this system by one of two
broad approaches: by governmental fiat-what Charles L. Schultze has
called the "command-and-control responses"' '-or by adjusting pri-
vate market incentives. This Article is premised on the notion that the
their physicians too) would regard as being appropriate if their choices were not distorted by
insurance." Feldstein, supra note 6, at 151, 154. Interestingly, despite the rising costs and increas-
ing availability of health insurance and of health care, patients' out-of-pocket costs did not rise in
1950-1969 as a percentage of disposable income. KRiZAY & WILSON 4. In large part, this situation
is traceable to the group employment plans which dominate the third party market. Under these
plans, the insured looks upon health care as a fringe benefit of employment and seldom knows its
true cost. Id 30-32.
9. There appear to be several reasons why a fiscal intermediary might want to impose price
ceilings on providers. First and foremost, controlling medical cost inflation could reverse the pat-
tern of financial loss that has plagued many health insurance plans for a number of years. See
Private Health Insurance in 1974"A Review of Coverage, Enrollment, and Financial Experience, 39
Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1976, at 3-22; The Skyr the Limit on Health Care Costs, Bus. WEEK, May
26, 1975, at 72, 74; What Price Health Care? The Problem of Cost Containment, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON AMERICA'S HEALTH POLICY 38, 42 (1976).
Second, the efficient cost reducer could expect to capture a larger segment of the health
insurance market by reducing the price of his coverage to consumers below that of his competi-
tion. See Hearings on Competition, pt. 2, at 1049.
Third, an aggressive program of cost control by insurers would take the pressure caused by
health care inflation off the insurance industry, see H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS
AND HEALTH INSURANCE 405 (1961); Bodenheimer, Cummings & Harding, Capitalizing on Illness:
The Health Insurance Industry, 4 INT'L J. HEALTH SERvIcES 583 (1974), and place it upon those
best able to prevent cost increases--the hospitals and the doctors. Cf. S. LAW, BLUE CROSS-.
WHAT WENT WRONG? 117 (1974); H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra at 405-06.
Finally, a cost control program would make medical insurance plans more consistent with
the standard and sensible insurance practice of seeking to restrict payouts.
10. In a few pilot plans, chiefly sponsored by labor unions and other employment groups,
third parties are experimenting with fee controls over providers or care. See Webster County
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 536 F.2d 419
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Council on Wage and Price Stability, Employee Health Care Benefts: Labor and
Management Sponsored Innovations in Controlling Cost, 41 Fed. Reg. 40,298, 40,310, 40,317-18
(1976).
11. Schultze, The Public Use of Private Interest, HARPER'S, May 1977, at 43, 44.
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second alternative is more likely to succeed. 2 Given the chance to run
their natural courses, market incentives should draw insurance compa-
nies into the business of offering cost containment as a service to health
care consumers. That insurance companies have not already under-
taken to provide this service indicates that market forces have not been
permitted to operate freely. At every turn in the road to cost-control
innovation insurers have been faced with barriers, often in the form of
restrictive practices of organized medicine or of legislation created at
the behest of the medical establishment.1 3
Fee schedules are one of many innovations that insurers might
employ to bring down the barriers that have been erected to protect the
present third party payment system. To understand how fee schedules
would work to correct the pressures that push costs upward, it is neces-
sary to view them against the backdrop of traditional health care
financing.
B. Service Plans and Private Carriers
The market for health insurance has long been dominated by two
types of third party payors: Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans ("service
plans") and private commercial carriers. The service plans are non-
profit, tax-exempt organizations which contract directly with providers
of care to obtain services required by their subscribers, often at a price
discount.14 Private carriers, on the other hand, have no direct dealings
with providers but instead contract with their subscribers to indemnify
12. For a discussion of why a national health insurance scheme is unlikely to cure the ills
that afflict the third party system, see Feldstein, supra note 6, at 151, 158-59; Havighurst, Regula-
lion of Health Institutions, in CONFERENCE ON REGULATION IN THE HEALTH INDUSTRY OF THE
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROLS ON HEALTH
CARE 75, 79-80 (1975); Posner, supranote 6; Reinhardt, supranote 7, at 151. See also Hearings on
Competition, pt. 3, at 1583-84. For the argument that a monolithic national regulatory system may
be an unwise development in the health care industry generally, and hence that its impact should
be minimized, see Havighurst, FederalRegulation of the Health Care Delivery System:A Foreward
in the Nature of a "Package Insert," 6 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 577 (1975); Havighurst, supra note 5, at
1143, 1178-1215 (1973); Starr, .4 National Health Program: Organizing Diversity, in INsTrrr OF
SOCIETY, ETHICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 11, 12-13 (1975).
13. See, e.g., Ellwood, Alternatives to Regulation: Improving the Market, in CONFERENCE ON
REGULATION IN THE HEALTH INDUSTRY OF THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROLS ON HEALTH CARE 49, 54-55 (1975); Goldberg & Greenberg,
The Effect of Physician-Controlled Health Insurance: .S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J.
HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 48 (1977); Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the
Private Sector's Hand, 2 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 471, 488-89 (1977); Kissam & Johnson,
Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal Law: Toward a Theory of Limited
Reformmongering, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1163, 1167, 1203-32 (1976).
14. See KRIZAY & WILSON 5, 41-42. The Blues collectively cover about 40% of the insured
population.
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them for expenses they incur.1
5
The Blue service plans originated as creatures of the hospital as-
sociations, in the case of Blue Cross, and state medical societies, in the
case of Blue Shield. 16 Although provider control has become attenu-
ated, it still exists in some plans. 7 Typically, the Blues reimburse hos-
pitals for their costs and physicians for their reasonable professional
charges, as determined under a "usual, customary and reasonable fee"
formula (UCRF). Thus, the Blue Shield plans usually agree to pay par-
ticipating physicians their "usual" fee up to a stated percentile of the
range of fees that are "customary" for a particular procedure in the
area, with "reasonable" increases if there are complications.18
One possible effect of the UCRF system is to encourage physicians
to raise their "usual" charges to the maximum reimbursable level, then
to raise their "customary" fees more or less in unison when the service
plan recomputes. its UCRF schedule for the forthcoming year.19 Al-
though ostensibly serving as a maximum price ceiling, the UCRF could
thus easily become a minimum price floor and could allow doctors,
with only casual collusion, to ratchet costs upward each time the
UCRF schedule is revised. Efforts by service plans to resist this ratchet
effect by not releasing information on maximum reimbursement levels
may fail because providers can determine the maximum levels either
by exchanging information with each other or through simple trial and
error. Historically, under some Blue Shield plans, providers have
agreed to accept the UCRF as full payment for patients in lower in-
come brackets, while remaining free to charge more for patients who
are better able to pay. Thus, Blue Shield plans, even though in a posi-
tion to control costs because of their contractual relationship with prov-
15. Id 41, 97, 115. There are more than 1,000 private health insurance carriers in the United
States, most of them life insurance companies, collectively managing over 50% of the health insur-
ance market. Their market power is well dispersed; the 20 largest insurance firms account for only
73% of the commercial market. Id 5. However, the "big four" commercials- Aetna, Travelers,
Prudential and Metropolitan--control, between them, 20% of the national health insurance mar-
ket. Hearings on National Health Insurance Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1542-43 (1974).
16. See Havighurst, HMO's 769-70.
17. Provider domination of Blue plan boards of directors continues even though their per-
centage representation on the boards has been declining in recent years. See GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE ON HEALTH CARE, FINAL REPORT 106-07 (Ohio 1973); S. LAW, supra note 9, at 6-13, 25-30
(1974); What's Blue Shield Up To Now?, MED. ECON., Sept. 6, 1976, at 92, 102.
18. KRIzAY & WILSON 41, 115-16.
19. See id 115-16. For a theoretical discussion of the effect of UCRF on costs, see Frech &
Ginsburg, Imposed Health Insurance in Monopolistic Markets: A TheoreticalAnalysis, 13 ECON.
INQUIRY 55, 67-69 (1975). An empirical study of the ratchet effect of UCRF pricing is presently
being conducted by David Eisenstadt, Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Mis-
souri at Columbia.
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iders, may have in fact contributed to cost escalation.2 °
Private carriers have not had the direct link with providers that the
service plans have enjoyed, and they have therefore not been strategi-
cally placed to work aggressively towards cost control. The tax-exempt
status and price discounts enjoyed by the service plans put the private
carriers at some competitive disadvantage in any event, and they have
been reluctant to risk the displeasure of physicians. 2' They have thus
generally followed the leadership of the service plans in accepting
UCRF fees, further contributing to the inflation cycle.22 Moreover, ef-
forts by private carriers to resist excessive charges in a systematic way
have met with stiff opposition from the medical profession, which has
insisted that fee issues be submitted for professional "peer review. ' 23
Nevertheless, insurance companies have begun to express substantial
interest in the fee schedule approach to controlling health care cost in-
flation.24
Because commercial insurers normally do not pay providers di-
rectly but instead indemnify their insureds for covered services, their
use of fee schedules to contain costs would require writing a new and
more limited type of insurance coverage. Subscribers would be covered
in full for their medical expenses only if they accepted care from partic-
ipating providers. Participating providers-possibly organized in a
group practice-would agree in advance to accept the insurer's fee
schedule in determining their charges. If the subscriber obtained treat-
ment from a nonparticipating provider, he would either not be indem-
nified at all or would be indemnified on a less advantageous basis, such
as for some specified fraction of the bill. The insurance carrier might
even offer alternative plans at differing costs, in an effort to match effi-
ciency and quality of care to the subscriber's ability and willingness to
pay.21 Insured consumers of health care, in enrolling in a plan or in
choosing between participating and nonparticipating providers, would
for the first time be faced with choices reflecting relative fees. Likewise,
providers would be faced with competitive pressure to provide services
20. HEW PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 6, at 34. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1975,
at 40, cols. 6-7; Soaring Cost o/Medical Care, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 16, 1975, at 52, 53.
21. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
22. Havighurst, supra note 5, at 1157.
23. See Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 13, at 63-65; Rosenberg, He ChallengedAetna's
Hard-Line Fee Policy--and Won, MED. ECON., Sept. 11, 1972, at 31.
24. See, eg., Bailey, ising Health Care Costs-A Challenge to Insurers, 8 NAT'L J. 608, 609
(1976); What Price Health Care? The Problem ofCost Containment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TiONAL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON AMERICA'S HEALTH POLICY 38, 41-43 (1976).
25. See Newhouse & Taylor, supra note 6, at 78, 87-89.
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more efficiently and to control their prices in order to obtain patients.26
C. Utilization Review and Closed Panels.
To be truly effective, fee schedules should be coupled with other
insurer-instituted cost-control measures. Utilization review is a natural
concomitant of the use of fee schedules. Without some sort of check on
utilization, the savings gained by a ceiling on what can be charged for
specific procedures could easily be lost as providers order more proce-
dures or more visits.27 To combat this tendency, insurers might require
that providers submit to a review mechanism similar to the Profes-
sional Standard Review Organization (PSRO) program-the federal
government's vehicle for curbing over-utilization of services under
Medicare and Medicaid.28 Once again the mechanics of obtaining pro-
vider cooperation would probably require differentiating coverage be-
tween participating and nonparticipating doctors. Physicians
participating in the insurer's program could be required to obtain ad-
vance approval of some hospital admissions and some costly proce-
dures as a condition of payment so that only medically necessary-and
not merely possibly desirable-care would be paid for by the plan. Sec-
ond opinion requirements might also be employed as a precondition
for coverage of surgery.2 9 While necessitating considerable change in
medical practice and forcing the physician to concern himself with the
limitations of insurance coverage, such arrangements would greatly en-
hance assurances that the plan reimburses only essential care and that
other care is either not provided at all or is performed at the patient's
personal expense. Educating consumers to such selective coverage
would undoubtedly be difficult, but lower insurance premiums would
encourage consumers to consider its value.30
26. See Ellwood & McClure, Memorandum on Health Delivery Reform 2 (unpublished pa-
per, Interstudy, rev. Nov. 17, 1976).
27. Insurers could take an active role in maintaining good quality care as well as lower price
by requiring participating providers to submit to quality-assurance regulation, perhaps on the
PSRO model, and by undertaking malpractice litigation on behalf of insured patients. By intro-
ducing such controls, insurance companies could short-circuit the quality issue which physicians
and hospitals often raise as a smokescreen to oppose controls on cost and utilization. See Bauer &
Densen, Some Issues in the Incentive Reimbursement Approach to Cost Containment- An Overview,
31 MED. CARE Rnv. 61, 90 (1974). Goodcare does not equate to the most expensive care. See also
Havighurst, supra note 13, at 479-81; McClure, supra note 6, at 28 (the rapidly rising costs of
health care have not resulted in discernible improvement in health levels).
28. See Bailey, supra note 24, at 609.
29. The hospital associations in Oregon in the 1930's used prior approval as well as utiliza-
tion on review. See Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 13, at 50-55.
30. Some insurers are presently experimenting with second opinion requirements and utili-
zation on review, apparently with striking success. See Council on Wage and Price Stability, supra
[Vol. 1978:645
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Intimately related to fee schedules and utilization review is the
closed-panel concept. Insurers can reduce premiums without reducing
their insureds' basic protection only if their insureds can obtain essen-
tial medical treatment at reduced costs. That guarantee is possible only
if insurers can differentiate among providers in writing coverage, in-
ducing insureds to seek care from those providers who have contracted
in advance to abide by the insurer's various cost-containment initia-
tives.
Closed-panel arrangements can take a wide variety of forms, sev-
eral of which have recently been identified by the term "health care
alliance."'31 Under the alliance model, a closed panel of providers, per-
haps including one or more hospitals, administers care on a traditional
fee-for-service basis. Subscribers, who may obtain care only from doc-
tors within the plan, pay premiums based upon the cost experience of
the participating providers. Doctors and patients thus share the benefits
of the doctors' greater efficiency. Whatever the merits and deficiencies
of the various possible closed-panel models, they could best be worked
out in the competitive marketplace, not in abstract discussion. The sig-
nificant point is that closed panels are central to the goal of reintroduc-
ing competition in the market for insured health services. Insurer-
organized closed panels seem easier to organize than most "health
maintenance organizations" (HMOs), which they somewhat resem-
ble,32 and more competitive than the even more closely analogous "in-
dependent practice associations" (IPAs), which are usually sponsored
note 10, at 40,298, 40,300-03, 40,319-20; Peck, Peer Review, Courtesy Goodyear Tire & Rubber,
MED. ECON., Apr. 4, 1977, at 31. See also Havighurst, supra note 13, at 484-85.31. See Elwood & McClure, supra note 26; Reynolds, A New Scheme to Force You to Com-
,petefor Patients, MED. ECON., Mar. 21, 1977, at 23.
A Health Care Alliance (HCA) would be organized by an insurer, and would consist
of a limited set of hospitals and doctors who have been designated by the insurer to
function as an economic unit in delivering comprehensive medical care to consumers
who have expressed a preference for the alliance plan. Each community could have
several HCAs, and any insurer could set up more than one HCA if he cared to. But
in order to attract consumers, each insurer would attempt to select for participation in
his preferred HCAs, providers who could provide good quality care at a reasonable
cost, and especially providers who make conservative use of the hospital ....
Providers could participate in one or more HCAs if they cared to, but would have to
negotiate reimbursement arrangements separately with each HCA.
Ellwood & McClure, supra note 26, at 4 (footnote omitted); cf Lavin, "We Ask the Wrong Ques-
tions About National Health Insurance," MED. ECON., Aug. 8, 1977, at 35.
32. For discussion of HMOs, see generally KRizAY & WILSON 125-39; H. SOMERS & A.
SOMERS, supra note 9, at 344-58; Havighurst, HMO's 716; Phelan, Erickson & Fleming, Group
Practice Prepayment: An Approach to Delivering Organized Health Services, 35 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 796 (1970); authorities cited in note 13 supra. HCAs resemble HMOs in that both arrange-
ments offer services by a relatively small number of physicians and both achieve administrative
economy through unusually close insurer-provider relations. However, since HCA doctors would
be paid on a piece-work basis rather than a flat salary, they would have greater incentives than
HMO doctors to provide efficient service.
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by organized medicine.33 Most important, closed panels under insurer
sponsorship are a natural evolution from customary insurance plans
and seem to be the shortest step to reorganizing health care delivery
and imposing market checks on provider spending of consumer-con-
tributed resources.
Under closed-panel systems, insurance companies for the first time
could become involved in directly policing the fees charged for individ-
ual services. Fee levels and the standards employed in utilization re-
view (which simply defines plan coverage and does not purport to
prescribe good medical practice) might vary depending upon the pre-
miums charged and the insurance contract. Fee schedules and closed
panels would work in tandem to match consumers and providers of
care on the basis of the prices acceptable to each. Insurance companies
under such a scheme would be providing to consumers the long neg-
lected service of cost containment. To society, the insurers would be
providing the service of creating and maintaining a market in which
trade-offs between price, quality and the desire for insurance coverage
govern the allocation of health services.
Before this market can come into being, however, certain legal ob-
stacles must be surmounted. Restrictive state legislation, such as so-
called "Blue Shield laws" requiring physician dominance or approval
of all health financing plans, prohibitions against closed panels, and
specific insurance coverage requirements must be overcome. In addi-
tion to these state restrictions, fee schedules cannot be imposed on doc-
tors unless the schedules are free from the strictures of the antitrust
laws? 4
III. THE ANTITRUST THREAT
A. The Sherman Act's Ban on Price Fixing.
The branch of antitrust law most likely to constrain the formation
and implementation of fee agreements between health care insurers
and providers is the prohibition against price fixing.35 Section one of
33. See notes 144-46 infra and text accompanying notes 144-57 infra.
34. Commercial insurers have expressed interest in the fee schedule approach to cost control,
see text accompanying note 24 supra, but they are wary of possible antitrust liability; some have
even requested an exemption from the antitrust laws as a condition precedent to bringing price
restraints to bear against providers. See text accompanying note 217 infra.
35. Other aspects of antitrust law that may touch upon insurer-provider fee arrangements
are those relating to monopoly and monopsony power, exclusive dealing arrangements and group
boycotts. Monopsony questions would arise whenever an insurer possessing enough market power
to control prices or exclude competition exercises that power by securing fee arrangements with
providers. See notes 71-72 infra and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 94 infra.
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the Sherman Act makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination...,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states."136 Despite this seemingly all-inclusive language, only some
types of agreements "in restraint of trade" have been found to be so
anticompetitive in purpose or effect that they have been denounced as
illegal per se. In cases not involving practices previously declared to be
per se violations, the courts employ a "rule of reason" and will tolerate
otherwise useful commercial contracts even though they embody re-
Group boycotts and exclusive dealing usually arise as violations of section three of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), which probably does not pertain to professional service payment
arrangements because its concern is with the "sale of goods." However, the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) has the power to attack practices which offend the principles of section three even
though there may be no technical violation, and the Sherman Act's "contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade" language, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), would reach these practices as
well. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321, 322 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertis-
ing Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95, 397 (1953).
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, would most likely arise in the health insur-
ance context if insurers agreed not to deal withproviders who are unwilling to accede to their fee
contract terms, or vice versa. Conceivably such a boycott could be saved if its purpose and effect
were not clearly anticompetitive, see, eg., De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975) (concerted action by automobile dealers to prevent auto manu-
facturer from granting dealership on special terms not available to other dealers did not violate
&ection one), or if it were reasonably ancillary to a permissible joint venture, see C. KAYSEN & D.
T6RNER, ANTrrRUST POLICY: AN ECONoMIc AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 47, 146 (1959). But generally
concerted refusals to deal fall under a virtual per se rule. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). And a combination to boycott can be inferred from parallel
action in some instances even where no overt expressions of agreement are made. See, e.g., Inter-
state Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
It would not be surprising to see exclusive dealing arrangements spring up in insurer-pro-
vider contracts; either the provider would promise to treat only patients covered by a particular
fiscal intermediary, or the carrier would agree not to send insured patients to rival hospitals or
physician specialists. The legality of such agreements is determined by a rule of reason inquiry
into their purposes and into the extent of market foreclosure effected by them. See Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-10 (1949); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sun-
kist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 959 (1976). Exclusive
dealings could help reduce the personal and financial burdens that price bargaining could impose
on providers by making relations with insurers more stable. They could also help a new entrant
insurer or a failing company to secure a foothold in the market. For these reasons, they may be
useful devices for use in establishing HCAs, HMOs and other new forms of health care delivery.
Exclusive dealing arrangements between insurers and providers would probably be found illegal
only if so substantial a portion of the relevant health care market were tied up that entry became
restricted, or if the contracts themselves were unreasonable in duration or otherwise oppressive.
See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973)
(implying that exclusive dealing contract between hospital and Blue Cross plan, insuring 51% of
local population and covering 62% of all insured hospital days, would violate antitrust laws). It is
worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court has shown i propensity in recent years to accept
the FTC's judgment that exclusive dealing practices should be stopped in their incipiency before a
substantial clog on competition occurs. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966);
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section three of the Sherman Act extends the same proscriptions to
the District of Columbia. Id § 3.
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straints on trade unless, considering the history and purpose of the re-
straint, the power structure of the market in which it developed and its
likely desirable and undesirable effects, the restraint is determined to
be "undue. '3 7 But price-fixing agreements are firmly ensconced in the
prohibited categories; no inquiry as to their purposes or effects is ordi-
narily permissible."
As will be discussed more fully below, not all contracts that have
an effect upon price are properly considered price-fixing agreements.
Obviously, where a buyer and seller agree upon a price, there is no
violation, although a problem of a different kind could arise if either
the buyer or the seller possessed excessive market power or could co-
erce the other contracting party.39 Even an arrangement between com-
petitors that had a price-fixing aspect could escape condemnation if the
price agreement could be characterized as an "ancillary" restraint-a
reasonable measure necessary to achieve a desirable commercial pur-
pose other than the repression of competition in the market.40 Finally,
it is possible, though some case law suggests otherwise, that fee sched-
ules that establish only maximum, rather than minimum, prices might
be held lawful since they permit competition instead of imposing naked
restraints on price.41 In these instances, especially if the factual situa-
tion were unprecedented, the rule of reason, rather than per se rules,
would probably govern the outcome of a Sherman Act challenge.
37. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 0 (1911); see United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 1945). Professor Bork maintains that the rule of reason
invalidates restraints only when their anticompetitive results exceed such desirable effects as in-
creased efficiency or availability of goods or services to consumers. See Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 1, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375-76 (1966);
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 1, 74 YALE
L.J. 775, 833-34 (1965).
38. See Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (vertical maximum price fixing);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (horizontal maximum
price fixing); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal minimum
price fixing); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical
minimum price fixing).
Other restraints have also been condemned in per se terms under section one. See United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market division); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements).
Proof of the existence of restraints such as these is sometimes said to preclude evidence of
their reasonableness. See Bork (Part I), supra note 37, at 783-811. Nonetheless, other cases suggest
that a per se rule raises no more than a rebuttable presumption that can be overcome by a persua-
sive showing ofjustification. See id at 811-28.
39. See note 71 infra and text accompanying notes 71-72, 94 infra.
40. See text accompanying notes 57-73 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 78-96 infra.
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B. The Sherman Act's Applicability to Medical Fee Schedules.
It was not evident until recently that the "learned professions" are
subject to section one at all. In a landmark 1975 decision, Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,42 the Supreme Court finally determined that the
professions do not enjoy an implied exemption from the Sherman
Act.43 The case arose when the Goldfarbs, having contracted to buy a
house in Virginia, contacted numerous lawyers in the hope of finding
one that would search title for them cheaply. But no lawyer would
quote a price below the figure prescribed in a minimum fee schedule
promulgated by the Virginia State Bar.' The Goldfarbs paid the re-
quired fee for a title search and subsequently brought a class action
against the state and county bar associations seeking treble damages
and injunctive relief, asserting that the fee schedule constituted price
fixing proscribed by section one of the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court agreed. Relying upon the "heavy presumption against implicit
exemptions" from the antitrust laws,45 the Court concluded that bar
association restrictions, at least those tied as explicitly to a "business
aspect" of a profession as fee schedules, fall well within the scope of the
Sherman Act.4
The Goldfarb Court plainly directed its holding toward profes-
sions other than the legal profession, such as medicine and dentistry,47
and the lower courts48 and law enforcement agencies49 have been quick
42. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
43. Several prior decisions had indicated that law and medicine might share such an exemp-
tion. See, eg., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950);
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). But see, e.g.,
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943). For discussion of the Court's
decades of waffling on this subject, see Bauer, ProfessionalActivities and the Antitrust Laws, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 570, 572-84 (1975); Corley & Arnould, Professional Fee Schedules and the
Sherman Act, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 21, 27-32 (1975).
44. 421 U.S. at 775-76. The schedule recommended that lawyers charge a fee equivalent to
1% of the value of the property involved, whatever the complexity of the title records or the time
required to make a thorough search.
45. Id at 787 (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963);
California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)).
46. 421 U.S. at 787-88. The Court carefully restricted its discussion to the fee schedule ques-
tion and emphasized that nonbusiness-related restraints, even though they might otherwise be
invalid under the Sherman Act, might survive if exercised among professionals. Id at 787 n.17.
47. See id at 787, 792 (citing antitrust cases in the medical and dental contexts to show the
reach of the Sherman Act).
48. See, e.g., Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977) (reversing dismissal of suit by chiropractors charging health care insurer, medical associa-
tion and doctors with group boycott and attempt to monopolize); Boddicker v. Arizona State
Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977), citedin [1977j ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 800, at A-2 (professional society rules must serve public; if they
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to brandish Goldfarb's antitrust bludgeon against health care profes-
sionals. The courts have also extended Goldfarb to reach agreements
between physicians and health insurance companies,50 although there
remain substantial issues concerning whether the exemption in the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act of "the business of insurance" from the antitrust
laws might protect some such agreements." Thus, although medical
service minimum fee schedules of the sort proscribed by Goldfarb
would certainly be subject to section one attack,52 special considera-
tions to be discussed below would govern a Sherman Act attack on fee
schedules employed in the insurance context.
Not all professional fee schedules are invalidated by Goldfarb.
The price list issued by the Virginia State Bar was objectionable be-
cause it created a "fixed, minimum price floor" maintained by a dis-
cernible enforcement system. 3 Had it been, however, a "purely adpisory
fee schedule issued to provide guidelines," it would have presented a
will only suppress competition, they cannot stand); Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., No. C-2
75-473 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1976) (refusing to dismiss price fixing charges against medical associa-
tion); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Fla. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds on rehearing No. TCA 75-186 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18 and Dec. 3, 1976) (on
appeal to Fifth Circuit) (doctors' economic boycott of abortion clinic was within the reach of
Sherman Act); cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746.47 (1976). See
also Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, No. 76 C 3777 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 13, 1976), citedin [1976]
ANrrrRusT & TRADE REo. RaP. (BNA) No. 787, at A-14 (suit by chiropractors charging group
boycott and monopolization on the part of health care trade associations and officials thereof);
Ohio v. Mahoning County Medical Soe'y, No. 76-1684 (N.D. Ohio, fied Aug. 24, 1976), ciedin
[1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE RaG. RaP. (BNA) No. 784, at A-23 (suit by Ohio seeking injunction
against boycott of HMO by county medical society, council of private hospital medical staffs and
four doctors and against defendants' coercive tactics in preventing physicians from joining the
HMO).
49. See [1973] ArrrrRusT & TRADE RaG. RaP. (BNA) No. 619, at A-8 (Antitrust Division
recognizes no professional exemption from antitrust laws). See also text accompanying notes 189-
96 infra.
50. See, eg., Ballard v. Blue Shield 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977) (reversing dismissal of suit by chiropractors charging health care insurer, medical associa-
tion and doctors with group boycott and attempt to monopolize); Anderson v. Medical Serv., No.
73470-A (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 1976) (fee schedule agreements between insurer and gynecologists
might otherwise be within Sherman Act but were exempted by McCarran-Ferguson legislation).
51. See text accompanying notes 164-82 infra.
52. Legal writers have disagreed on whether minimum professional fee schedules are prop-
erly subject to the usual per se rule against price fixing. Compare Bauer, supra note 43, at 584-92
(advocates rule of reason approach), with Corley & Arnould, supra note 43, at 39-42 (fee sched-
ules are "blatant" price fixing, hence illegal whatever their purpose). But see United States v.
National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978) (reads Goldfarb as imposing a per se
rule against professional minimum fee schedules).
53. 421 U.S. at 781-83 & n.9. The Court emphasized that no lawyer needed to know more
than the value of the property to quote a fee, that no one other than a State Bar member could
lawfully perform a title search and that the State Bar's ethics opinions threatened cost-cutters with
professional discipline.
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different question. 4 Although purporting to be advisory, the schedule
in Goldfarb exceeded a merely advisory function because it described
fees for future, rather than past, transactions, because the minimum
rates rose over time and because all lawyers were motivated to conform
by the assurance that they would not be underbid." However, had
there been merely "an exchange of price information without a show-
ing of an actual restraint on trade," the Sherman Act might not have
been violated.16 Moreover, the fee schedule in Goldfarb was established
by a bar association, a group of competing professionals acting in con-
cert. Nothing in the case questioned the legality of a fee schedule pro-
posed by purchasers of legal services and assented to by the
professionals acting separately. In addition, no insurance plan was
present to provide a possible ancillarity or McCarran-Ferguson Act
justification for a price agreement.
Before considering in detail the status of contractually arranged
medical fees under section one of the Sherman Act, it will be helpful to
examine the doctrines relating to ancillary restraints and maximum
fees, concepts crucial to the defense of the fee schedule strategy.
IV. AVOIDING ANTITRUST LIABILITY
A. The .4ncillary Restraint Doctrine.
The doctrine of ancillary restraints, which can remove from the
per se category agreements affecting prices, applies where the restrictive
arrangement is incidental to a dominant commercial purpose that is
otherwise legitimate. Under one formulation, an ancillary restraint will
be treated under the rule of reason and will be considered lawful if it
"(1) is reasonably necessary to the legitimate primary purpose of the
arrangement, and of no broader scope than reasonably necessary; (2)
does not unreasonably affect competition in the marketplace; and (3) is
not imposed by a party or parties with monopoly power." 7
54. Id at 781 (emphasis added).
55. Id at 781-82.
56. Id at 781. This caveat seems to blunt the thrust of United States v. Container Corp. of
America, 393 U.S. 333, 3"37 (1969), which indicated that the mere flow of specific current price
information among competitors would raise a presumption of illegality. See note 209 infra and
accompanying text.
57. An excellent example of an appropriate application of the ancillarity principle is sug-
gested by Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soe'y of Composers, Authors & Publish-
ers, 562 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), discussedin 91 HARv. L. REV. 488 (1977). That case involved a
suit by the CBS television network against the American Society of Composers, Authors & Pub-
lishers (ASCAP) challenging ASCAP's practice of issuing "blanket" licenses granting the licensee
the right to publicly perform any composition in ASCAP's repertoire. The Second Circuit held
that ASCAP's licensing scheme was price-fixing because the royalty received by a composer
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Fee schedules imposed by health insurers on physicians who deal
with non-cost-conscious patients could easily be viewed as reasonably
necessary to accomplish a legitimate commercial purpose. Limiting
payouts is an accepted means of counteracting the so-called "moral
hazard" posed by insurance-the consumer's tendency to ignore cost in
his consumption decisions.58 The experience of the past twenty-five
years has demonstrated that the social goal of reducing medical care
inflation is not likely to be attained under a private third-party financ-
ing system unless direct fee constraints can be imposed upon providers
of care.59 A physician possesses a degree of natural monopoly power
over his patients6° and this power is enhanced by the presence of insur-
ance which relieves patients of concern about fees or other costs. In this
context, fee schedules would appear to be a reasonable means of facili-
tating efficient insurance protection, lowering its cost by counteracting
the monopoly power of physicians.
Moreover, fee control agreements do not appear to be broader in
scope than necessary to deal with the problems. Although courts might
be bothered by what seems to be insurer dictation of medical and hos-
pital charges, this would be a problem only where an insurer possessed
monopsony power,61 so that providers could not sell their services in a
competitive market. However, there would appear to be no practical
alternative way of controlling provider charges short of government
price regulation 62 -a method that could be much less effective, more
coercive or less attractive in other ways than private developments. The
through the blanket license is artificially fixed and represents a restraint on price competition
among composers. 562 F.2d at 135-36. The court suggested that the scheme might be legal, how-
ever, if it could be demonstrated that "market necessity" made alternative marketing methods
impractical. Id at 137-38, 140 & n.26. ASCAP, acting as middleman between the performer and
distributer (CBS) may, by pooling transactions, make the market for performance of musical com-
positions more competitive. See 91 HARv. L. REv., supra at 492-96. Compare Judge Taft's classic
formulation of the rule in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,282-83 (6th Cir.
1898), alf'a 175 U.S. 211 (1899); see United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356 & n.3 (1967);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951); United States v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 32-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 371 U.S.
296 (1963). See also Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958) (combina-
tion of majority of excelsior producers in Virginia to stop price-cutting by naming a sole sales
agent violated Sherman Act per se, but activities of the agent to lessen the producers' credit losses
and standardize product grades was lawful).
58. See, ag., Havighurst, supra note 13, at 474-75 & n.12; Meeks 876-77 & n.73.
59. See notes 5-13 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Hearings on Competition, pt.2, at 1039, 1580-84; S. LAw, supra note 9, at 32-33, 38-
41; Havighurst, HMO's 768-69; Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, I J. L. & ECON. 20
(1958).
61. See notes 71-72 infra and accompanying text.
62. See Hearings on Competition, pt.2, at 1039; see generally notes 60 supra & 197 infra and
accompanying text.
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problem with any cost-control approach aimed at forcing the patient to
shop around, such as larger deductibles, coinsurance requirements and
lower indemnification limits, is that the patient often lacks the time and
the opportunity to shop around when he needs medical care and, even
when he does shop around, he does not know what he actually needs.
Insurer-initiated fee controls would compensate for that ignorance and
for the consumer's economic weakness by developing purchasing ex-
pertise and by aggregating the buying power of greater numbers of in-
sureds.63
Turning to the second criterion, it is also clear that fee schedules
adopted by insurance carriers would not unreasonably injure competi-
tion in the health services market. Some providers of care will object to
these practices,6' but that will most likely occur because fee controls
will stimulate, rather than hinder, competition in the health care deliv-
ery market. If a group or association of insurers were to combine to
promulgate a fee schedule,65 or a combination of individual providers
63. See Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 13, at 67-69.
64. See, ag, Carlova, supra note 3, at 35; Edlund, Workshop on Techniques of Relative Value
Studies, 25 CONN. MED. 797, 800 (1961); f Havighurst, HMO's 777.
Limited third party "intervention" in the doctor-patient relationship is probably an inevit-
able concomitant of cost control. See Hearings on Competition, pt. 2, at 1049, 1051; Council on
Wage and Price Stability, supra note 10, at 40,298, 40,310, 40,318-19 (describing claims review
programs instituted by several large industrial firms, each of which reports savings of up to six-
figure sums annually). Such intervention is not as shocking as some would have us believe; many
of the innovations introduced into the health care delivery system in recent years-such as Medi-
care, Medicaid, PSROs, prospective reimbursement programs, HMOs, health planning agencies
and health insurance itself (at least in the Blue plans "service' concept)-in a very real sense
"interfere" with the practice of medicine. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 9, at 406-07.
65. Combinations of insurers to achieve cost controls over recalcitrant providers of care
would present significant dangers of(1) horizontal minimum price fixing as to both providers and
consumers; (2) market division and customer allocation; (3) conspiracy or attempts to monopolize
or actual monopolization; and (4) coercion against providers. Nevertheless, it has been suggested
that in some circumstances such a combination might be proper. See GOVERNOR'S TASK FoRcE
ON HEALTH CARE, FINAL REPORT 109 (Ohio 1973) (recommending that Ohio Director of Insur-
ance permit commercial insurers "too small to develop an adequate data base of their own" to
"develop an information sharing system for review of physicians' claims"). The argument in favor
of permitting such a horizontal arrangement is rooted in joint venture theory, a subdivision of the
doctrine of ancillary restraints. In essence, a joint venture is a combination of several persons to
accomplish jointly a "legitimate" purpose which may have anticompetitive implications; its legal-
ity turns upon a balancing of the magnitude and obvious desirability of the objective, on the one
hand, and the degree to which attainment of the objective requires collaboration, against the na-
ture, magnitude and probability of the feared restraint, on the other. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 360-61 (2d ed. 1974); cf United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176-77
(1964). Under this doctrine, competitors have been allowed to join forces to provide a public
service in a new market which they could not risk entering independently. See United States v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18, 32-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 371
U.S. 296 (1963) (airline and competing steamship company combined to form new corporation to
provide air service to South America; held, a permissible joint venture despite parent companies'
agreements not to compete with each other nor with their subsidiaries, because competitive risks
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were to join together horizontally to secure attractive fee arrangements
with third parties, 66 the arrangements would violate Sherman Act prin-
ciples. However, where an individual carrier acting alone uses its
claims data and other publicly available information to negotiate price
understandings with single providers, antitrust objections would cease
because the purchaser of the medical services and the seller of the serv-
ices would have sufficiently adverse interests to assure competitively
determined prices.67 Since competing insurers would offer contracts on
differing terms based upon their own cost control experience, no unrea-
otherwise would have prevented either parent from providing the service); E. GELLHORN, ANTI-
TRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 229-30 (1976); cf. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 136-
41 (where neither venture nor its individual participants possess substantial market power, joint
venture is presumptively lawful). Case law suggests that even a horizontal minimum price fixing
agreement among competitors may be sustained as a permissible joint venture if its purpose is
sufficiently important and its scope sufficiently circumscribed. See United States v. Morgan, 118
F. Supp. 621, 689-91, 731, 733-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (underwriters, consistent with their traditional
practice, could lawfully combine to float stock issues even though they jointly possessed great
market power and engaged in price fixing and market manipulation; the venture served a desira-
ble purpose in spreading the risks of new securities issues, and the price maintenance activities
were carried on for only minimal periods of time). But Gf United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963 (D. Mass. 1950) (joint action by American abrasives manufacturers
in establishing production subsidiaries abroad might be per se illegal due to day-to-day price
fixing, joint marketing and other informational exchanges involved in running the subsidiaries).
It has also been urged that otherwise objectionable restraints should be permitted when
utilized by a joint venture controlling only a nonsubstantial portion of the relevant market in an
effort to enable its participants to compete more effectively. SeeE. GELLHORN, supra at 228-30; C.
KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 35, at 138-39; Bork (Part II), supra note 37, at 391-475. But
where the joint venture serves only questionable public policies and appears to merely camouflage
a horizontal scheme to fix prices or divide territories, it cannot stand. See United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Further, a basically procompetitive joint venture may be struck down
where its desirable purposes could be achieved by less restrictive collaboration. See United States
v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (territorial division agreed to by members of associa-
tion of small grocers and imposed upon them by association was per se illegal under section one);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (joint venture to implement a
trademark licensing system violated Sherman Act where its main purpose was to divide the world
market for antifriction bearings).
There is strong superficial appeal to the idea of encouraging competition in the health insur-
ance market by allowing small firms or "new entrants" to combine their claims data for the pur-
pose of designing relative value scales in order to win a market foothold. The important public
goal of cost control would be served. If it only sought the exchange of data and not the compila-
tion of fee schedules, a combination could contribute to diversity in insurance plans without hav-
ing a measurably harmful effect on competition. But, as indicated above, there would be
considerable danger that a restraint of trade would occur. A new entrant could probably establish
a plan without entering a combination simply by relying upon the fee information offered by
providers interested in participating in the plan. Unless it can be shown that no such less restric-
tive alternative is viable, a claims data exchange among insurers should be disallowed.
66. See Havighurst, supra note 13, at 481-82; see note 143 infra and accompanying text; cf.
notes 99, 103-06, 113-15 infra and accompanying text (same conclusion as to pharmacists); notes
130, 141-42 infra and accompanying text (same conclusion as to lawyers); notes 189-213 infra and
accompanying text.
67. See Meeks 877.
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sonable restraint of trade would result, even though one carrier may
enter into substantially identical agreements with numerous provid-
ers.
68
Coercion is the third factor of the quoted ancillarity doctrine; it
may present some difficulties because some private third-party carriers,
especially the Blue plans, possess dominant buying (monopsony) power
in some localities.69 Already, one Blue Shield plan has been charged
with monopsony price fixing for having coerced druggists into partici-
pating in an oppressively unrenumerative prepaid drug plan.70 Al-
though it is not clear precisely what constitutes monopsony power,
generally it would require that prices be set in a noncompetitive fashion
so as to exclude competition and maximize the monopsonist's profits.71
In a monopsony situation, the ancillarity doctrine, if applied, should
not immunize the monopsonist-insurer from potential antitrust liabil-
68. See notes 103-04, 131-33 infra and accompanying text (same results reached with respect
to prepaid drug plans and legal expense insurance programs). This principle makes possible the
development of HCAs, HMOs and other alternative health care delivery systems.
69. See note 161 infra.
70. See Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S.Ct. 1448 (1978).
71. Monopoly power is loosely defined as "the power [of a seller] to control prices or exclude
competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Monop-
sony power is the same thing held by a buyer. But prices need not have been fixed nor competitors
excluded for such power to be found. Id at 389. Many cases have recognized monopoly power
only when a very high degree of market control-say, three-fourths or more-is demonstrated.
See, e.g, United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (95% of U.S. cigarette
sales); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (90% of national refining capacity);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (90% of national domestic
market for virgin aluminum ingot); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 307 (D. Mass. 1953), a ff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (75-95% of relevant market). But
other cases have suggested that lesser market shares may be sufficient to support monopolization
suits. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (film distribution monopoly in be-
tween 51% and 62% of 85 towns); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797
(1946) (more than two-thirds of domestic cigarette market); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export
Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976) (45-
70% of market held sufficient to support jury finding of monopoly power); United States v. Grin-
nell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 248, 251 (D.R.I. 1964), a 'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563, 571
(1966) (87% or a "predominant share of the market" is enough). Most recently, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals announced that there is no rigid rule requiring even 50% market control (al-
though 20% is clearly not enough). Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347,
1367-68 & n.19 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977). These cases can perhaps best be
harmonized by visualizing the offense of monopolization on a sliding scale on which the degree of
market domination required to make out a violation is decreased as the opprobriousness of the
challenged conduct increases. See P. AREEDA supra note 65, at 258; Cooper, Attempts andMonop-
olizatior" A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MIcH. L.
REv. 375, 401-03, 408-18 (1974); cf United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417
(1920) (combination of 180 steel firms aggregating 80% to 95% of domestic production at time of
formation, but which did not engage in brutal, predatory or unfair trade practices, and whose
market share declined to 40% at time of suit, was not guilty of monopolization).
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ity. The courts should instead prevent the dominant insurer from enter-
ing into fee-limiting contracts until its market power has been diluted
by smaller competitors utilizing fee agreements to capture a portion of
the local health insurance market.7z Similarly, if a dominant Blue
Shield plan, far from exploiting physicians, should use a liberal fee
schedule to attract allegiance of providers and thereby exclude other
insurers, that plan might be denied the right to use a fee schedule. This
misuse of fee schedules would limit entry by other insurers with alter-
nate plans because those insurers would have difficulty attracting pro-
viders who would be willing to accept lower fee limits, thus eliminating
some desirable consumer options from the marketplace. Control of the
Blue Shield plan by the local medical profession would strengthen the
case for attacking both the use of overly generous fee schedules and the
UCRF system.7" In both cases, providers would be taking advantage of
the market power of Blue Shield to raise, rather than contain, their
charges.
Despite the dangers outlined above, there are powerful reasons
why certain kinds of fee schedules are desirable in the insurance con-
text.74 They contribute to the predictability of risks75 and thereby per-
72. This result could be achieved by applying the rule against vertical price fixing. See Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); notes
79-95 infra and accompanying text.
Alternatively, the same result could be attained through section two of the Sherman Act,
which makes it unlawful for any person to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire. . . to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States. . . ." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section two complements section one by prohibiting certain anticompetitive
acts undertaken by a single person acting alone which might be illegal under section one if per-
formed by two parties acting in combination. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
61-62 (1911).
Fee control agreements negotiated between local providers and third parties with monop-
sony power would call for particularly close scrutiny because of possible exclusionary impli-
cations. Secondary boycotts and exclusive dealing arrangements in such circumstances would
almost certainly violate section two because they are exclusionary by definition. A per se rule
might also be appropriate to condemn fee schedules in such agreements because the necessary
effect would be to preserve the insurer's monopsony power. Use of monopsony power by Blue
Cross and Blue Shield is especially controversial since each achieved its power not by having it
thrust upon it nor through superior skill, foresight or industry, but because of special treatment by
the health care providers who controlled them for the purpose of preventing competition in the
health services delivery system. See text accompanying notes 152-54 infra. But see Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80, 85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973) (Blue Cross plan
which insured 51% of the population and covered 62% of all patient days covered by private
commercial insurance in a 29-county area did not violate section two by negotiating 10-15% re-
ductions in hospital rates for Blue Cross patients below those charged non-Blue Cross patients;
Blue Cross owed its success to the completeness of its coverage and its willingness to take risks; no
showing that other insurers could not have secured similar cost discounts).
73. See text accompanying notes 143-63 infra.
74. See also notes 63 supra and 186-88 infra and accompanying text.
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mit lower premiums. They also assist providers of care in pricing their
services and can therefore eliminate friction over fees between the pro-
vider vis-k-vis the insurer and insured. Also, unlike horizontally estab-
lished minimum fees of the Goldfarb variety, fee schedules do not
require market power to be effective, 76 nor do they prevent price com-
petition for patients who are not insured by the plan utilizing the nego-
tiated schedule. Further, they need not produce uniform charges, for
insurers may agree to pay some doctors more than others. Finally, fee
schedules in the insurance context will serve a vital social pur-
pose-controlling runaway health care costs, 77 not by fiat or govern-
ment fee schedule, but by putting both buyers and sellers in a
competitive market setting.
B. The Rule of Reason and Maximum Price Restraints.
Insurers will probably want price agreements with providers to
take the form of maximum, rather than fixed minimum, fees. A sched-
ule of maximums would establish a range within which the provider's
fee for a given procedure could fall, depending on the time and skill
involved, the results achieved and the difficulty and complexity of the
case. The third party could use utilization and quality checks to deter-
mine the appropriate fee. Due to their utility, maximum figures have
become common in fee schedules in proposed and operating prepaid
legal service plans.78
These contractual arrangements could be viewed as vertical com-
binations between buyers and sellers of services, 79 however, resulting in
antitrust scrutiny. Structurally, they resemble maximum resale price re-
strictions imposed by sellers of goods upon their distributors, which the
Supreme Court has twice in recent history denounced as unlawful
under section one.8" In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 81 the Court struck down a horizontal agreement between two li-
75. See note 186 infra and accompanying text.
76. Goldfarb is discussed in text accompanying notes 42-56 supra. Because of this distinction
there will be no coercion, no tying up of a significant portion of the market, and probably no
unreasonable restraint of trade. Cf. United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153,
178-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
77. See also Havighurst, supra note 13, at 474-75.
78. See Meeks 882 & n.95. See text accompanying notes 127, 131, 141-42 infra.
79. An unlawful combination or contract in restraint of trade can be found in an agreement
negotiated between an individual seller and his individual buyer. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
80. See also Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948) (beet growers could sue sugar refiners for combining to fix the purchase price of sugar
beets).
81. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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quor manufacturers that imposed a maximum limit on the prices at
which wholesalers could resell their products. Despite evidence that the
manufacturers' purpose was to break up a price-fixing conspiracy
among the wholesalers which had presumably reduced the manufactur-
erg' gross sales, the Court declared that horizontal maximum resale
price maintenance (RPM) agreements, "no less than those to fix mini-
mum prices [by and among competitors, cripple] the freedom of traders
and thereby [restrain] their ability to sell in accordance with their own
judgment. 82 Kiefer-Stewart did not announce a per se rule in terms,
but the enigmatically terse opinion of the Court did seem to apply the
language and the reasoning of per se cases,83 and the case has been
read as holding maximum RPM to be illegal per se.84
Subsequently, in Albrecht v. The Herald Co.," the Supreme Court
held that it was unlawful under section one for a newspaper manufac-
turer to insist that its retail distributors sell its newspapers at or below a
stated maximum price. The majority found, rather unconvincingly, that
Kiefer-Stewart controlled the outcome of the case.86 It did not charac-
terize that decision, however, as setting forth a per se rule, but instead,
after discussing several ways in which vertical maximum RPM could
be economically abusive (none of which were identified as present in
the facts of Albrecht) concluded that the challenged price restraint,
"without more," violated the Sherman Act. 7
Most writers have determined that Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht
should not be read to denounce maximum RPM under the per se
rule. 8 Unlike normal per se cases, these decisions were not the culmi-
82. Id at 213.
83. The Court said that it intended to "reaffirm" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding minimum price fixing agreements between competitors to be per se
illegal), and quoted some of the language from that decision: "Under the Sherman Act a combina-
tion formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabiliz-
ing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." 340 U.S. at 213
(quoting Socony-Vacuun, 310 U.S. at 223). The Court offered no explanation why the Socony-
Vacuum dictum applied to a maximum price agreement in an RPM context, other than that the
agreement would restrict a businessman's freedom to sell in accordance with his own judgment.
See text accompanying note 82 supra. But that rationale would seem to apply to any commercial
contract. Clearly, more analysis was needed to explain why horizontal maximum RPM agree-
ments should not be covered by the rule of reason that controls the validity of most commercial
contracts. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-67 (1911).
84. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); E.
GELLHORN, supra note 65, at 183; J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUsT LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-
TION, 16 BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 6.02[3] b, at 6-103-05 & n.70 (1975); 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 411,
413-14 (1968).
85. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
86. Id at 151-54.
87. Id at 153.
88. As to Kiefer-Stewar, see Bork (Part II), supra note 37, at 464-65; 37 U. CIN. L. REV.,
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nation of a long series of rulings establishing that the challenged prac-
tice can rarely, if ever, be justified and that the usual evidentiary
inquiry into purpose, power and effect would be wasteful.89 Nor did
these decisions discuss the possible benefits and detriments to efficiency
and competition posed by the restraint under attack, so as to conclude
that virtually no defense would be successful, as have most per se
cases.90 It is plain, moreover, that the results of Kiefer-Stewart and
Albrecht can be explained by rule of reason analysis.91 Consequently,
there is no need to read them as per se holdings condemning maximum
supra note 84, at 413-14. As to Albrecht, see 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 208, 215-16 (1968); 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 862, 864-65 (1969); 37 U. CN. L. REV., supra note 84, at 414-16.
89. See J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 84, § 65.02[1]b, at 6-75-79. See also United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-24 & n.59 (1940), discussing numerous prior minimum
horizontal price Axing cases and the possible economic benefits and harms of such restraints, con-
cluding that minimum price fixing agreements deserve to be held illegal per se, whatever their
purpose and effect. By contrast, Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht are the only maximum price restraint
cases that the Supreme Court has decided, and no other such cases are cited in either opinion.
90. See J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 84, § 6.02[1]b, at 6-75 & n.19; see note 89 supra. See
Bork (Part II), supra note 37, at 464-65, for a discussion of some of the possible benefits and harms
of maximum price fixing.
While horizontal and vertical maximum resale price restraints may be rightly condemned in
many instances as unreasonable restraints of trade, there are legitimate defenses that might be
discernible in the facts of individual cases. Anticompetitive motives seem to be relatively easy to
identify; but where the manufacturers' interests coincide with the consumers', maximum RPM
should be permitted, unless the same desirable ends can be attained through less restrictive alter-
natives, such as suggested retail prices.
91. The Kiefer-Stewart result is perhaps best explained by the very real coercion that the
manufacturers were imposing on their wholesalers. Not only did they set maximum resale prices,
but they also agreed to minimum prices to the wholesalers which restricted the latter to a narrow
and inflexible price range. No competition was realistically possible; the maximum was, in effect,
the only price at which wholesalers could sell. Yet, since minimum price agreements were at that
time protected from Sherman Act attack under state fair trade laws, competition could be restored
only by striking down the maximum RPM agreement. See 37 U. CIN. L. REv., supra note 84, at
413-14. Kiefer-Stewart can also be interpreted as a condemnation of a vertical restraint imposed
pursuant to an unjustifiable horizontal combination. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145,
164-65 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bork (Part II), supra note 37, at 464. Finally, Kiefer-Stewart
may be viewed as condemning a restraint for which there was a less restrictive alternative. De-
fendants sought to put an end to an unlawful cartel by creating one of their own. A noble goal, but
one which they could have achieved through much less questionable means--they might simply
have brought suit under section one, alleging that defendants' price fixing had reduced the sales of
their products.
A brecht too is explicable by rule of reason analysis. As in Kiefer-Stewar, the majority indi-
cated that a vertical maximum price restraint could not stand where it arose in connection with an
entirely unjustifiable restraint, in this case a territorial allocation system for newspaper distribu-
tion. See 63 Nw. U.L. REv., supranote 88, at 864-65; 37 U. CIN. L. REv., supra note 84, at 414-15.
Indeed, Justices Douglas and Harlan thought that the legality of the territorial restraint was the
only real issue in Albrecht. 390 U.S. at 154-56 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 165-66 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Herald did not show that it had lawfully granted Albrecht a territorial monopoly;
hence it failed to prove that its maximum price restraint was legitimately intended to prevent price
gouging. Under these cases, maximum RPM might well be held lawful where it is used to restrain
legally acquired market power.
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There are compelling reasons not to apply the rule against verti-
cally imposed price restraints in the context of fee controls on medical
and hospital services. Insurer-provider cost-control agreements differ
from the restraints at issue in Kiefer-Sewart and Albrecht in both facts
and policy. First, insurer-initiated controls over providers do not re-
quire market power to be effective, even though a horizontal combina-
tion in Kiefer-Stewart and the market power of a newspaper in
Albrecht made controls effective. Second, insurer price controls over
physicians and hospitals do not restrict the resale price of anything.
RPM of the Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht variety "cripples the freedom
of traders" to resell to consumers the goods they have purchased from
the manufacturers. However, the price fix in insurer-provider contracts
occurs at the first purchase because the insurer does not merely act in
the interest of the ultimate purchaser-it is the ultimate purchaser.
These are purchase and sale agreements with no restraint on alienation.
Third, antitrust policy would prefer contractual price controls in the
health insurance field over the Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht restraints
because no less restrictive method can achieve the socially favored pur-
pose of cost control, the purportedly primary goal in all three instances.
The defendants in Kiefer-Stewart could have fulfilled this purpose
without price restrictions by suing their distributors for price fixing
under section one of the Sherman Act. The Herald Company could
have ended Albrecht's price raising activities simply by eliminating the
territorial restrictions which it had itself imposed on its distributors and
which shielded him from price competition. In comparison, insurers
have no analogous alternative because the ability of health care provid-
ers to charge high prices is a lawful result of their natural monopoly
power over their patients.93
Viewed under rule of reason standards, cost-control fee agree-
ments between single insurers and single providers should escape sec-
tion one proscription for the above reasons. In terms of power, purpose
and effect, maximum fee schedules should present little to lift the eye-
brows of the antitrust court, with two caveats. First, price control agree-
92. See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), holding that
territorial restrictions in dealer franchise contracts, previously held to be per se illegal in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), are to be judged by the rule of reason. The
Court reinstated the rule of white Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), that vertical
restraints as to customers and territories are not per se illegal. The Syivania rationale- that per se
rules are proper only against practices that are manifestly anticompetitive--should also shatter the
seeming "per se" rule of Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht. See note 91 supra and text accompanying
notes 88-91 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
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ments initiated by an insurer with dominant power in the market
would evoke the dangers associated with monopsony pricing, such as
coercion and entry-limit pricing, and should probably be forbidden.
94
Second, if the maximum figures set in each insurer-provider contract
tended in practice to become the minimum charges as well, the case law
barring vertically imposed minimum prices might be invoked against
them;95 the better logic, however, would find even contractual mini-
mum prices to be justified under the ancillarity doctrine.96
The utility, as well as the limits, of the foregoing analysis of ancil-
lary restraints and maximum fees are aptly demonstrated by the anti-
trust experience of prepaid drug and legal service plans. The antitrust
principles that emerge from those experiences serve well as a guide for
the proper structure of any insurer-initiated fee constraint programs for
medical care providers. It is perhaps indicative of the medical profes-
sion's power and resistance to infringements on doctors' fee-setting pre-
rogatives that experience with fee schedules has been more extensive in
these other fields than in medical insurance.
C. Antitrust Experience with Prepaid Drug and Legal Service Plans.
1. Prepaid Drug Plans. Prepaid drug subscription plans typi-
cally involve contracts between insurers and pharmacists under which
the insurer undertakes to pay, as payment in full for drugs furnished to
insureds, the cost of the drug to the pharmacist plus a service fee. The
service fee may be computed either as a fixed percentage of that cost, as
a single sum added uniformly to all prescriptions or as a combination
of the two. 97 Whichever approach is taken to professional pharmaceuti-
cal fees, however, it is evident that readily identifiable costs constitute a
94. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); P. AREEDA,
supra note 65, at 500-04. Professor Bork has questioned the rationale of the Dr. Miles case, point-
ing out that minimum RPM is economically desirable in many instances and should be judged
under the rule of reason. Bork (Part II), supra note 37; Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and
Yamey, 76 YALE L.. 731 (1967); see also E. GELLHORN, supia note 65, at 254-60. Arguably, Dr.
Miles should have no bearing in the insurance context in any event because health care fee agree-
ments do not restrain the resale of any goods or services. Compare the discussion of Kie/er-
Stewart and Albrecht in the text accompanying note 93 supra.
96. This logic has been followed in antitrust experience with prepaid drug plans. See notes
57-77 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Myers, 10 AM. PHARMACEtJiCAL AJ. 628, 632, 636, 639 (1968); Oppenheim, Anti-
trust Policy and Third-Party Prepaid Prescriotion Drug Plans, 40 GAO. WAsH. L. REV. 244, 246
(197 1). The uniform professional fee approach is increasingly prevalent in recently designed pre-
paid drug plans, but the "variable fee" approach is arguably fairest and most advantageous to
small pharmacists since it can take into account the differences in operating costs of different drug
retailers.
Consumers may, under any of these plans, purchase drugs from nonparticipating druggists,
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larger proportion of the total charge in the pharmaceutical retail indus-
try than in the medical care industry and that fewer variables compli-
cate the service fee computation. This is probably one reason that
insurers finally did begin employing contractually fixed prices in pre-
paid prescription plans but not in plans covering medical and hospital
services.98
In a 1969 address to a convention of retail pharmacists, a Depart-
ment of Justice spokesman set forth the Antitrust Division's policies on
fee provisions in prepaid drug plans. It is a per se criminal violation of
the antitrust law's prohibition of price fixing for professional pharma-
cists collectively to agree upon service fees or to suggest prices to spon-
sors of prepaid plans. Pharmacists may not lawfully combine to
bargain collectively for prices for dispensing drugs. Third-party plans
may lawfully set uniform drug service fees, but only if the third party
unilaterally adopts the fee and if pharmacists decide individually
whether to participate in the plan and to accept its prices as reasonable.
Although an insurance firm may discuss suggested prices with individ-
ual pharmacists, it will open itself to prosecution for participation in a
price fixing scheme if it solicits suggested prices from groups of phar-
macists or solicits agreements from such groups of pharmacists to dis-
cover an acceptable price.99 Subsequently, another Antitrust Division
spokesman clarified the latter point, indicating that "the fact that drug-
gists know that they are receiving [and accepting] offers identical to
those made by the carrier to competing druggists does not, in and of
itself, result in an agreement [among druggists] in violation of the anti-
trust laws."'"
Implicitly, these guidelines recognize the desirability of insurer-
imposed controls on drug costs, despite their possible effect of uniform
prices. The guidelines stress that the antitrust objection to fee fixing
under prepaid plans centers upon price agreements among the recipi-
ents of the fees-the providers of services-rather than upon price
agreements between individual providers and insurers. When the third-
party payor is involved, the fee limitation may appropriately be viewed
but they are penalized for doing so since they will only be reimbursed for a portion (usually 75%)
of the amount charged.
98. Another reason may have been the fear of concerted opposition by organized medicine.
99. Address by Lewis Bernstein, Chief of the Special Litigation Section of the Antitrust Di-
vision of the United States Department of Justice, before the Annual Convention of the National
Association of Retail Druggists, in Las Vegas, Nevada, Oct. 15, 1969, reprinted as Antitrust As-
pects of Prepaid Prescription Plans (mimeo), cited in part and quoted in part in Oppenheim, supra
note 97, at 260-62.
100. Hearings on H.. 5 & 19 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting
Small Business of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1971). See
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954).
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as a tolerable ancillary restraint, reasonably necessary to the execution
of a financially sound insurance plan, because it enables the insurer to
make accurate predictions of payments and to compensate for the in-
sured's lack of cost-consciousness in purchasing.
Despite this encouragement from a principal government antitrust
watchdog, 01 early prepaid pharmaceutical plans received a mixed re-
ception. Michigan's Attorney General in 1969 advised Blue Shield and
Blue Cross that a proposed drug plan which would pay pharmacists
their costs plus a fixed fee set by the Blues might constitute illegal price
fixing under the Sherman Act and could also violate Michigan's anti-
trust law.' 2 The following year, in Blue Cross v. Virginia, °3 the
Supreme Court of Virginia struck down a similar fixed fee Blue Cross
prepaid drug plan on the ground that it represented a conspiracy to fix
prices and, therefore, was banned by both federal and state antitrust
statutes."° Although the Antitrust Division had favorably reviewed a
similar plan, 05 the court's ruling seems consistent with the Division's
guidelines, in that Blue Cross had sought and received the support of
the statepharmaceutical association on the principle of fixed fees and on
the amount of the fee.106 The Virginia court also thought it significant
that the state's insurance commission had refused to approve the plan
on the ground that it constituted a conspiracy to fix prices. 7 In con-
trast, the Supreme Court of Illinois approved a somewhat similar pre-
paid drug plan on the ground that it was exempted from federal and
state antitrust prosecution by special state statutory exemptions.10 8
101. The FTC has shown little interest in monitoring prepaid drug plans. It recognizes that
complex antitrust and consumer welfare issues must be balanced in this area, but, pending a fac-
tual investigation of its own, appears to be willing to follow the Justice Department's thinking.
Hearings on Competition, pt.2, at 301-03.
102. Opinion of the Attorney General of Michigan, 1969 Trade Cases 86,917.
103. 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E.2d 439 (1970).
104. Id at 189-92, 176 S.E.2d at 443-46. The court appreciated the desirable purposes of the
plan, id at 184, 188, 191, 176 S.E.2d at 441, 444, 446, but found that its effect had been to raise and
stabilize prices, id at 184, 188, 176 S.E.2d at 441, 444. The decision is favorably reviewed in
Comment, A 'ix"at the Local Drug Store-Blue Cross Runs Afoul of the Sherman Act, 57 VA. L.
Rnv. 315 (197 1). However, Professor Oppenheim vigorously criticized its rationale in Oppenheim,
supra note 97, at 246-66.
105. 211 Va. at 191-92, 176 S.E.2d at 446. As the court pointed out, the Antitrust Division's
business review letter dealt with plans in California and Kansas and may not have considered all
of the facts present in the Virginia case.
106. Id. at 182-83, 187, 188, 176 S.E.2d at 440-41, 443, 444; see note 99 supra and accompa-
nying text.
107. The Bureau of Insurance of the State Corporation Commission initially approved the
plan, 211 Va. at 183, 176 S.E.2d at 441, but later condemned it as violative of Virginia and federal
antitrust law. Id. at 181, 184, 192, 176 S.E.2d at 440, 442, 446.
108. B & L Pharmacy, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 46 Ill. 2d 1,262 N.E.2d 462 (1970).
The case is unfavorably reviewed at 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 940 (1971) on the basis of its interpretation
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Critics of the Blue Cross case charged that it would be but a
short step from the Virginia court's per se condemnation of the uni-
form fee to an antitrust attack upon any formula related to the deter-
mination of a professional fee on the ground that the formula-
determined fee inevitably becomes an agreed upon fee between the
third-party carrier and the participating pharmacists.'
0 9
Some pharmaceutical associations, industry representatives and insur-
ance groups pressed for an antitrust exemption to enable pharmacy
groups to negotiate fees with insurers.110 Alternatively, one pharmaceu-
tical spokesman proposed that rigid antitrust enforcement be tempered
to permit such negotiations."' Finally, Professor Oppenheim, on be-
half of the pharmaceutical industry, took the surprising position that
pharmacists could form a foundation to negotiate price contracts on
their behalf without violating the Sherman Act since such a foundation
could be viewed as reasonably ancillary to the main lawful purpose of
enabling small pharmacists to compete with other sources of prepaid
pharmaceutical services (such as HMOs and other "cooperative pre-
paid health care arrangements") and because of other public interest
features (such as review of quality and appropriateness of services ren-
dered).1 12
The Justice Department has stood firm against these proposals, but
subsequent developments have suggested that competitive prepaid drug
plans can thrive within the limits set in Blue Cross. In 1973, the Anti-
trust Division reaffirmed the principles of its earlier guidelines and ex-
plained that groups of pharmacists may meet with plan sponsors to
establish uniform reimbursement forms and methods and to otherwise
reduce the administrative burdens of such programs. The Division reit-
erated, however, that it would consider it illegal for pharmacists to
agree to prices charged third parties and to agree to refuse to deal with
of state law. Cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 595-98 (1976) (exemption of business
from Sherman Act scrutiny by state regulation will be found only where the exemption is "neces-
sary" to state policy).
109. Oppenheim, supra note 97, at 251. Professor Oppenheim simply missed the point. It is
one thing when a group of professionals, acting in their aggregate self-interest, agree to a uniform
price; it is quite another when an insurer, acting in its contrary self-interest, negotiates a single
price with each of them separately.
I10. See Hearings, supra note 100, at 10-15, 306-07, 314; Oppenheim, supra note 97, at 263-
64; [1972] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 593, at A-3 & A-4; [1971] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 521, at A-19 & A-20.
I11. See Hearings, supra note 100, at 11-12; [1971] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 521, at A-19 & A-20.
112. Oppenheim, supra note 97, at 264-66; [1972] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 593, at A-3 & A-4. Aside from the ancillarity argument, Professor Oppenheim does not satis-
factorily explain why the activities of such foundations would not constitute price fixing or group
boycotts. Nor does he explain why small pharmacists could not compete in a more effective and
less restrictive manner by subscribing to insurer-designed price proposals.
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any insurer except on terms set by pharmacists. '1 3 True to its promise,
the Division has twice approved associations of independent pharma-
cists where no price agreement element was contemplated,"' 4 but it has
refused to approve prepaid service plans operated by pharmacists who
planned to set professional fees." 5 At least a half-dozen cost-plus, third
party-designed prepaid pharmaceutical plans are currently in opera-
tion;' 6 until very recently, none had undergone antitrust challenge.
In Royal Drug Co. v. Group Lfe & Health Insurance Co.,"I7 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found a Blue Shield drug plan illegal
under the Sherman Act. As in the Blue Cross case, the defendant (Blue
Shield) negotiated a uniform service fee with participating druggists
statewide. The plaintiff pharmacists claimed that the price set by Blue
Shield was predatorily low-so low that it made the business of phar-
macy unprofitable for small independent pharmacists-and that Blue
Shield was able to coerce participation in the plan by virtue of its mar-
ket power." 8 The court agreed with the plaintiffs' contentions and
found that Blue Shield's practices could not be excused under the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act's "business of insurance" exemption. The case
113. [1973] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA) No. 619, at A-7. It is open to question
whether the Antitrust Division's concession on "administrative burdens" opened too large a loop-
hole. A recent development in health insurance demonstrates how easily collective bargaining
between provider groups and insurers over "administrative burdens" can become collective bar-
gaining for control of a health insurance plan. In that instance, a consortium of medical societies
in the Detroit area all but gutted a proposed Blue Cross-Blue Shield second opinion requirement
in elective surgery cases by overloading it with preconditions, including a two-year retrospective
study of the value of second opinion requirements before the plan became operational, and de-
manding that medical society representatives participate in the management of the plan. See MDs
Winning "Second Opinion" Fight, Am. Med. News, Apr. 18, 1977, at 1. Possibly, the Antitrust
Division's stance can be justified on the ground that administrative problems in drug plans are
much less complex than the administrative problems that may arise in medical care plans and are
therefore less likely to interfere with the cost control purpose. But competitive strategies can focus
on administrative efficiencies, too; it seems anomalous that the Division did not require that they
be given a chance to do so.
114. See [1975] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 744, at A-14 (approving forma-
tion of association of independent pharmacies in southern California to enable members to buy
drugs and other health-related items at prices normally available only to buyers of large quanti-
ties; members are not to agree on resale prices and association will not suggest or exert pressure as
to resale prices); [1975] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 740, at A-9 (approving organ-
ization of Missouri Foundation for Pharmaceutical Care, a nonprofit foundation managed by
pharmacists, health care providers and consumers (but not controlled by pharmacists) for the
purpose of operating a prepaid pharmaceutical service plan under contract with insurer, employer,
union and government groups; participating pharmacists are to charge their own usual, customary
and reasonable fees).
115. See [1975] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 787, at A-14.
116. See Council on Wage and Price Stability, supra note 10, at 40298, 40305-07, 40317-18.
117. 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 1448 (1978).
118. See idat 1378-80 (reciting plaintiffs' allegations and holding that the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act does not immunize Blue Shield from the Sherman Act).
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appears to present a situation of a monopsonistic insurer fixing the
price at which it purchases services. In such a case, the court could
properly find the price fix to be unlawful under the rule of reason.
Antitrust experience with prepaid pharmaceutical plans, although
limited, bolsters the belief that the basic policy concern in insurer-pro-
vider cost-control schemes utilizing fee schedules is not with the verti-
cal price-determining aspect of the plan but with the danger of
horizontal price agreements among providers. Problems for third par-
ties arise not merely when the third party uses its aggregate buying
power to negotiate a good price with providers, but also when, as in
Blue Cross, it negotiates with provider groups or invites price talks with
or among such groups or when, as in Royal Drug, the insurer possesses
monopsony power and wields it coercively to exploit suppliers of serv-
ices. Some authority would question the legality of any plan that pro-
motes price uniformity among its participants, but the Justice
Department eschews that approach, at least where pharmacists are free
to participate in numerous plans, thereby promoting interplan competi-
tion.119 Given the even more noticeable differences in skill and effi-
ciency that presumably exist among physicians than among
pharmacists, 20 one would expect insurers not to propose uniform
prices to all providers participating in a prepaid health plan but rather
that there would be intraplan, as well as interplan, price competition in
the medical services market. Hence, antitrust risks seem to be of lower
degree in prepaid medical insurance than in prepaid drug insurance
and should be all the more readily undertaken.
2. Prepaid Legal Service Plans. The concept of insurance for
professional services is much newer to the legal profession than it is to
the medical profession. Prepaid medical plans in this country have
blossomed since the 1930s and can be traced to the nineteenth cen-
tury, ' 2' but prepaid legal plans were still in the planning stages in the
119. Compare note 102 supra and accompanying text with notes 99-100 & 113 supra and
accompanying text.
120. This assertion does not intend to demean professional pharmacists and their valuable
work, but only refers to the fact that physicians' services are broader in range and variety, and,
accordingly, in the skill and efficiency with which they are performed, than pharmacists' services.
121. Although the third party medical payment system stems ultimately from the mutual
benefit funds used in medieval guilds, H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 9, at 225, the third
party reimbursement concept in this country can be traced back only to the 1800s. However, the
mushroom growth of the third party system has been more recent. Health insurance did not firmly
take root until the great depression of the 1930s when physicians and hospitals began to require
that their fees be paid. See S. LAW, supra note 9, at 6-11; Physician Control ofBlue ShieldPlans Is
Subject of FTC AnItrust Invesigation, Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 6, col. 3. Between 1940 and
1972, fiscal intermediaries increased their population coverage from 12 million to 182 million
persons, embracing how fully 90% of the American people. Hanson, The Private Insurance Indus-
[Vol. 1978:645
THIRD PARTY PA YORS
late 1960s122 and operate today in only a few localities. 123 The orga-
nized legal profession, however, has come to back the insurance con-
cept as a means of ethically financing legal services and of extending
them to groups that previously had little access to them, particularly
the middle class,124 and it seems safe to assume that legal insurance is
here to stay. Since the Goldfarb case specifically applied antitrust prin-
ciples to the legal profession,125 the designers of and potential partici-
pants in new prepaid legal insurance plans have been especially
conscious of the problems of determining legal service fees without in-
curring antitrust attack.
No antitrust suit has yet challenged the payment mechanism or
any other aspect of any prepaid legal service plan. However, the Amer-
ican Bar Association has issued antitrust guidelines regarding prepaid
plan pricing mechanisms that closely track the foregoing discussion of
price manipulations in prepaid medical and pharmaceutical service
plans. 126 The ABA envisions a plan proposing maximum price sched-
ules which would bind participating attorneys as a form of fee con-
trol. 27 It concludes that no antitrust problem would arise if the
try and State Insurance Regulatory Activities as Alternatives to Federaly Enacted Comprehensive
National Health Insurance Legislation, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 677, 690-91 (1975) (statistics include
coverage by HMOs and FMCs). See also KRIZAY & WILSON 8-10; H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS,
supra note 9, at 254-60.
122. See Stolz, Insurancefor Legal Services:-A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U. CHI. L.
Rav. 417 (1968).
123. For recent discussion of planned and operative prepaid legal services programs, see,
e.g., Boeggeman, PrepaidLegal Services-Some New Developments, 25 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 327
(1975); Meeks 859-65; Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Regulation of Legal Service Plans, 1977 Am. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 359; Young, Group Legal Services and Canon 1, 34 MD. L. REv. 541,
551-65 (1974).
124. See Grainger, Prepaid Legal Services-An Update, 26 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 230, 233-
34 (1976); Washington Note 1012 n.6, 1013-25.
125. See notes 42-56 supra and accompanying text. See also American Bar Association and
Justice Department Explain Positions on Minimum Fee Schedules to Senate Subcommittee, 59
A.B.A.J. 1296, 1298-1300 (1973).
126. See, e.g., ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, COMPILATION OF
REFERENCE MATERIALS ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, "Antitrust" at i (1973); Boeggeman, supra
note 123, at 335; Grainger, supra note 124, at 234; Meeks; Washington Note 1025-70. Some pre-
paid legal insurance plans and their proponents have assumed that plans could be marketable and
actuarially sound without imposing any price restraints on providers of legal services. See, e.g.,
Politz, The Longsought AnswerZ 7 TRIAL 29, 32 (Mar./Apr. 1971); Sorenson, Trends in Prepaid
LegalInsurance, 1973 INS. LJ. 209, 213; Young, supra note 123, at 556, 557, 559. But it was also
recognized that "[t]here is no easy answer" to the problem of possible misallocation of expensive
resources posed by the difficulties of defining "legal services" without fee schedules and prevent-
ing the over-utilization of lawyers which insurance encourages. Stolz, supra note 122, at 429-36;
see Meeks 876 & n.73. And it is said that the failure of prepaid legal plans to state what portion of
a lawyer's fee will be paid has hindered their acceptance by the public. See Young, supra note
123, at 558 n.80 and authorities cited therein.
127. Compare notes 78-96 supra and accompanying text.
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schedule is agreed to by lawyers or law firms acting alone or if the
agreeing lawyers are employees of the plan. 2 8 Similarly, no problem
occurs where "the fee schedule is set by an insurance company, by a
consumer group, or by any other group other than those who provide
service and receive payment therefor," even though such a substantial
number of lawyers agree to the plan that the maximum fee schedule
makes prices more uniform in the legal services market. 129 However,
where the plan designing such a schedule is controlled by lawyers or
representatives of the organized bar-and "[m]ost plans contemplated
by the various state and local bar associations are now in this
form"-the schedule constitutes price fixing.' 30
The Department of Justice has lent support to these guidelines in
its repeated refusals to approve the establishment of California Law-
yers Service (CLS), a nonprofit open-panel prepaid legal services foun-
dation sponsored by the State Bar of California. Under the CLS plan,
participating lawyers would provide services throughout the state at
maximum fee levels to be established by CLS.' 3' In discussing its rea-
sons for denying favorable review to the plan, which it plainly consid-
ers desirable in principle, 32 the Antitrust Division indicated that a
proposal to retain control over CLS entirely among lawyers for an ini-
tial three-year transition period "would create serious competitive
risks."' 133 The Division did not state that possible price fixing was its
sole or chief objection to professional control of CLS, but it did declare
that no price schedule would be sanctioned without further investiga-
tion of its compilation and final form. 134
Two other features of the Antitrust Division's refusal to approve
the CLS plan warrant mention. First, the CLS fee schedule proposal
was to be based upon a relative value schedule for lawyers' services
that would be designed by an independent accounting firm; no antitrust
clearance could be given "until after the survey has been completed
and the Department has investigated the manner in which it has been
128. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 126, at i.
129. Id See Meeks 875 & n.66.
130. ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 126, at i. See
Meeks 875-82. See also Grainger, supra note 124, at 234; Washington Note 1037.
131. See [1975] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 702, at A-12.
132. See id; Letter from Thomas E. Kauper to Peter F. Sloss (Aug. 5, 1974), refprinted in
Boeggeman, su.pra note 123, at 337-40.
133. Letter, supra note 132, at 338. See also [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 805, at A-22 (in a business review letter of Feb. 4, 1977, the Division denied approval of a
plan sponsored by the New York County Trial Lawyers' Association substantially similar to the
CLS proposal, whereby the Association was to set the fees for the first year of operation only)
(discussed at notes 141-42 infra and accompanying text).
134. Letter, supra note 132, at 340.
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conducted and examined the results."13 Presumably, the Division was
concerned primarily with the possibility of lawyer-controlled CLS ma-
nipulation of the relative value schedule, but no indication was given of
the antitrust status of such a schedule if CLS were not dominated by
lawyers. At least one other antitrust writer has, however, concluded
that use of a relative value study in the latter circumstances would be
lawful. 136
Second, the Antitrust Division opposed the CLS proposal because
its role, in light of other state bar restrictions on prepaid legal service
plans, might be to restrain interplan competition. Because it was "pri-
marily concerned" with the plan's impact on "the development and
preservation of competitive alternatives for the delivery of legal serv-
ices to the public," the Division could not approve an open-panel pre-
paid plan that would enjoy special advertising and solicitation
advantages over closed-panel prepaid plans to such an extent that the
latter might be squelched as a competitive force.' 37 This concern for
closed-panel plans is important. Open-panel plans resemble traditional
medical care financing structures-the consumer chooses the lawyer he
wants and the lawyer bills his usual fee. 13 8 Closed-panel plans are
analogous to what health care financing would look like under a system
of fee-restrictive contracts-the consumer may procure services under
the plan only (or primarily) from participating attorneys whose charges
are dictated by a schedule. 139 Numerous commentators have supported
the Justice Department's conclusion that closed-panel plans are desira-
ble competitive alternatives to open-panel arrangements and that orga-
nized professional resistance to them constitutes an unlawful restraint
of trade." This backing of the closed-panel concept should be viewed
as a green light to health insurers.
135. Id
136. See Washington Note 1037-38 & 1069.
137. See Letter, supra note 132, at 338-39. Kauper further objected to the California State
Bar's prepaid plan restrictions in that they would unreasonably limit the number of open panel
plans that could compete with CLS. Id 339-40.
138. See Washington Note 1013 & n.7.
139. See id at 1013 & n.8.
140. See Boeggeman, supra note 123, at 335-36; Grainger, supra note 124, at 234; Washing-
ton Note 1028-36. See also id at 1024 (closed panel plans generally cost consumers less than open
panel plans). The primary theory advanced by these authors is that bar association discrimination
against closed panel plans constitutes an illegal group boycott. The United States Supreme Court
has upheld the validity of several closed panel legal plans. See United Transp. Union v. Michigan
State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1970); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For discussion of various bar association approaches to restraining com-
petition among closed and open panel plans, see Washington Note 1013-23. But see Grainger,
supra note 124, at 234 (positing that closed panel plans themselves might be viewed as illegal
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Recently, the Antitrust Division has clarified its position on the
extent to which lawyers may participate in controlling the fee schedule
for a prepaid service plan. The New York County Lawyers' Associa-
tion proposed a plan whereby the association would set maximum fees
for participating lawyers during the first year of operation, and thereaf-
ter the fee schedule would be supervised by a, subscriber-dominated
managing committee. Initially, the Antitrust Division opposed the plan
because the association would stabilize fees without consumer input
during the pilot year.'4 1 However, when the plan was subsequently re-
vised to permit the subscriber-dominated committee to alter the fee
schedule even during the pilot year, the Division gave its blessing. 142
This series of events shows that antitrust policy objects not merely to
fixed minimum, but also to maximum prices when they are established
by concerned professionals, and even when the period of the fix is rela-
tively short. However, where those with economic interests adverse to
the profession's are in a position to control the schedule, antitrust ob-
jections are obviated.
V. SEPARATING FEE SCHEDULES FROM PROVIDER CONTROL:
THE CRUCIAL LIMITATION
The foregoing discussion of ancillary restraints, maximum fees
and prepaid drug and legal service plans allows some definite lines to
be drawn on the permissible scope of fee schedule arrangements in the
medical profession. This section of the Article will delineate those guid-
ing principles, and then argue that two existing forms of fee schedule
arrangements-fee schedules set by foundations for medical care
(FMCs) and the Blue plans' UCRF system-appear to violate them.
The governing rule that emerges from the prepaid drug and legal
service plans is that the antitrust laws basically support such plans ex-
group boycotts). For discussion of constitutional theories under which restrictions on prepaid in-
surance plans may be attacked, see Washington Note 1066-67 n.303.
141. See [1977] ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 805, at A-22.
142. See [1977] ANTnTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 809, at A-11. One must ques-
tion how any bar association promulgated fee schedule can escape antitrust proscription. See
notes 189-212 infra and accompanying text for discussion of why medical association fee sched-
ules should be held impermissible. There is danger that such schedules will set floor prices at
noncompetitive levels that may infect the entire industry. But maximum prices, as opposed to
minimum prices, present a lesser threat to competition. See Meeks 884-85; see notes 78-96 supra
and accompanying text. It could also be argued that prepaid legal plans, unlike prepaid medical
plans, are so new and lacking in actuarial fee data that there was no alternative to minimal bar
association participation at the outset and that, therefore, the involvement present here could be
justified under the rule of reason. Under this analysis, the initial fee schedule would be excused as
the kind of "purely advisable fee schedule" referred to in the Goldfarb case, see notes 54-56 supra
and accompanying text.
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cept to the extent that they camouflage or embody horizontal agree-
ments by competing providers of services. Physicians may not agree as
a group on an acceptable fee arrangement or suggest that arrangement
to an insurer. Physicians may not combine and collectively bargain for
favorable fees. 143 A fee schedule would be illegal if it received the im-
primatur of a medical association or if a medical association served as
an "advisor" to an insurer in its compilation. Fee schedules, to pass
muster under the antitrust laws, must be unilaterally initiated by insur-
ers and offered to individual providers for their acceptance or rejection.
The line between legal and illegal fee arrangements may often be
extremely fine. It would not be illegal, for example, for individual phy-
sicians to be aware of the fact that other physicians are receiving sub-
stantially similar fee arrangement offers. It would, however, violate the
antitrust laws if physicians made their acceptance or rejection decisions
in concert or conditioned their acceptance upon the agreement of
others. It would also violate conventional antitrust analysis if doctors
made their decisions in a consciously parallel fashion, that is, if an ex-
change of pricing information through fee schedules amounted to a
tacit invitation to follow a concerted pricing course and the invitation
were uniformly acted upon.
143. Health care providers have pushed the notion that they may permissibly "unionize" to
enter into "collective bargaining" with insurance carriers. See Craver, The Application of Labor
andAntitrust Laws to Physician Unions: The Needfor a Re-Evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a
Radically Changing Field, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 87-92, 95-97 (1975); MDs May Quit Blue Shield
Plan, Am. Med. News, Dec. 13, 1976, at 21 (a doctors' guild sent notices to Arizona's 2800 physi-
cians asking whether they wanted the guild to be their statewide bargaining agent in Blue Shield
reimbursement rate discussions). Through such collective action providers hope to avoid victimi-
zation at the hands of so-called insurer "Goliaths." See Alper, Why I Joined.A Union, PRISM,
May 1974, at 26; Craver, suprg at 59 and authorities cited at 59 n.23; cf. Oppenheim, supra note
62, at 252. But the FTC does not share their enthusiasm that federal labor legislation could ex-
empt doctor groups from the Sherman Act, see [1977] ANTiTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 803, at A-19, A-21. Other commentators have convincingly argued that it would be inappro-
priate to construe physician "unions" as labor groups because most health care providers are
independent contractors, not employees, see Glantz, A Reply to Professor Craver: Physicians in
Private Practice A1ready Have Enough Power, 27 HAsTINGs L.J. 315, 316-17 (1975); Comment,
Private Physician Unions: FederalAntitrust and Labor Law Implications, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 983,
1001-06 (1973), and because the monopoly power already wielded by providers, see note 60 supra
and accompanying text, even now affords them individual bargaining power "far beyond anything
a normal union could desire," Glantz, supra, at 316; see id at 330; c. Craver, supra at 75 (individ-
ual action by physicians would probably suffice to encourage insurers to reconsider any "oppro-
brious policies"). The antitrust prohibition would not, of course, apply to physician employees of
health care plans such as HMOs; those groups have abandoned the fee-for-service monopoly prac-
tice and already enjoy the benefits of federal labor law. See Craver, supra at 91-92; Glantz, supra
at 317. Nor would it prevent the formation of HCAs, where the organizing insurer would negoti-
ate a fee schedule independently with each participating provider. See note 68 supra and accom-
panying text.
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Obviously, policing fee schedules so as to prevent them from cross-
ing the line from desirable cost control to impermissible horizontal
combinations can be difficult. Nevertheless, an acceptable bright line
guide can be fashioned. Fee schedules that are developed with any in-
volvement by a medical association of any kind should be condemned
per se. Fee schedules that are initiated as the independent effort of in-
surers, however, and are negotiated with doctors who make their deci-
sions individually, should be encouraged. This kind of arrangement
should be approved unless there is affirmative proof that it has been
abused-that it is a sham that hides an agreement among doctors, per-
petrated either by a deliberate combination to fix prices or through the
more subtle pressures of a medical association. Unfortunately, the fee
schedule efforts that have been the most prevalent in the medical pro-
fession to date fall on the impermissible side of this antitrust analysis.
Perhaps the most blatant examples of concerted provider involve-
ment in fee setting arrangements are the FMCs.14 FMCs are individ-
ual practice associations 4 ' that provide prepaid health care but are
sponsored or managed by state or county medical societies rather than,
as in the case of group practice prepayment HMOs or insurance com-
panies, by lay groups.'4 6 FMC plans are structurally similar to HMOs
and differ from conventional health insurers in that the same organiza-
tion acts as both insurer and provider of care. Theoretically, this struc-
ture stimulates cost savings by creating financial incentives for
participating physicians to police each other's performance to seek effi-
ciencies in treating patients.'47 In addition to utilization review, 48
FMCs set limits on the fees paid for each type of service.' 49 Although
the maximum fees may be set by means other than the UCRF ap-
proach, the parallel to the practice of Blue Shield plans is close. Indeed,
FMCs have been described as second-generation Blue Shield plans en-
144. See generall, K. BAUER, CONTAINING COSTS OF HEALTH SERVICES THROUGH INCEN-
TIVE REIMBURSEMENT 211 (1973); H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, supra note 9, at 422-23; Auger &
Goldberg, Prepaid Health Plans and Moral Hazard, 22 PUB. PoL'y 353, 358-63 (1974); Egdahl,
Foundations for Medical Care, 288 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 491 (1973); Sasaly & Hopkins, A
Medical Society-Sponsored Comprehensive Medical Care Plan, 5 MED. CARE 234 (1967).
145. See sections 1302 & 1311(a) of the HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-1(5) & 300e-
10(a) (Supp. V 1975). FMCs are a variety of what was formerly known as prepaid group practice,
a form of health insurance in which contracting providers offer a complete line of medical services
to the public on the basis of a prepaid annual capitation fee. In 1971, these plans covered about
five percent of Americans. KRiZAY & WILSON 125-41.
146. FMCs also differ from HMOs and commercial insurance in that they provide intensive
peer review of fees and utilization.
147. See KRizAY & WILSON 125-41.
148. See Havighurst, HMO's 769; Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the
Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARv. L. REv. 887, 919-21 (1971).
149. See KRIzAY & WILSON 140; Egdahl, supra note 144.
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gaging in somewhat more aggressive cost containment than traditional
service plans.'5 ° Some FMCs have not in fact accepted financial risks
but have instead been enlisted by health insurers to perform PSRO-like
cost containment services that the insurers have not been willing to
supply themselves.' 5
1
One should note the crucial distinction between the efforts of
FMCs, which are run by organized medicine, and the cost-containment
measures suggested in this Article. Because of the medical society spon-
sorship of FMCs, their maximum price control takes on a horizontal
aspect not present in insurer-initiated plans. The price-determining ac-
tivities of the foundations go far beyond the limits indicated by the data
dissemination cases.' 52 Structurally, FMCs closely resemble the pro-
posed bar-sponsored prepaid legal insurance plans to which the Justice
Department has objected on Sherman Act grounds.153 It should come
as no surprise then that FMC-type provider price-control activities, es-
pecially some of the Blue plans, are being attacked as anticompeti-
tive.' 54 Professor Havighurst has forcefully argued that the very
purpose of FMCs is to set an entry-discouraging price that will pre-
clude other forms of third party competition and thus that a per se rule
would be appropriate to condemn them.'55 Indeed, an antitrust rule
against horizontally fixing maximum, as opposed to minimum, prices
makes sense only because of the probability that entry-limiting pricing
is involved.' 56
The success of the foundations,'57 like Blue Shield plans before
them,158 in perpetuating fee-for-service medicine and precluding devel-
opment of alternative delivery and financing systems suggests that no
less restrictive alternative to insurer-imposed fee limits is available to
achieve meaningful cost restraints in the health care industry. Even at
their best, FMCs raise neither competitive nor countervailing forces to
break down or offset the monopoly power of contracting providers;
150. Havighurst, Speculations on the Market's Future in Health Care, in AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE INSTITUTE, REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION 249, 257-62 (C. Havighurst
ed. 1974).
151. Id
152. See notes 198-213 infra and accompanying text.
153. See notes 131-36 & 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
154. See Havighurst, HMO's 768-70. No antitrust actions have yet been brought against
FMCs as of the time of this writing.
155. Id at 769-77; f Egdahl, supra note 144, at 496 (FMC operations could destroy the
viability of third party insurers as independent intermediaries in the health care delivery system).
But see Comment, supra note 143, at 1009-10.
156. See P. AREEDA, supra note 65, at 317.
157. See Egdahl, supra note 144.
158. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
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rather, they preserve and perpetuate that power by curbing only its
worst excesses.
A second example of a fee-setting arrangement that ought not to
be permitted to stand under the antitrust laws is the UCRF reimburse-
ment system that has been utilized by the Blue service plans. The
problems of the UCRF system have already been discussed;'5 9 they re-
volve around the tendency of maximum UCRF limits to become mini-
mum price floors for the entire medical community. The premise of the
UCRF is that physicians are subject to competitive pressure in setting
their prices and that reference to "usual" and "customary" fees consti-
tutes reference to objective, market-determined prices. But, as service
plans and insurers have covered more and more physicians' services,
that premise has weakened and seems now to have largely disappeared.
To a large degree, physicians' prices are now "administered;" lower
fees do not expand a physician's business, and higher fees not only cost
the physician few customers but, under the UCRF regime, are their
own excuse for being.
Although in theory physicians participating in service plans using
the UCRF approach to fee control are not given information on the
maximum charge that will be paid, in practice the charge is probably
not difficult to ascertain. Physicians may exchange such information or
they may simply derive it through trial and error-charging high fees
and reducing them in increments until they are finally paid by the plan.
Secrecy has not prevented the prevailing maximum from quickly
becoming first a minimum and then a plateau from which to launch
another fee increase.
When the UCRF system's price-raising possibilities are coupled
with the historic ties that Blue Shield plans have had with the medical
profession and the involvement that medical groups have had in the
establishment and implementation of maximum fees, the UCRF sys-
tem presents a serious risk that its net effect is to raise fees rather than
to lower them.160 But, whether or not this risk has materialized in fact
(a matter that would probably be hard to prove in an antitrust case),
159. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Ohio v. Ohio Medical Indem., Inc., Civil No. C-2-75-473, at 7-9 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 16, 1976) (refusing to dismiss action charging state medical society and member doctors with
fixing physicians' fees through their control of the state's largest Blue Shield plan); [1976] ANTi-
TRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 753, at A-9 (as part of larger inquiry into competition in
delivery and financing of health care services, FTC is investigating nature and extent of physician
control of Blue Shield plans and its impact on fee levels and other forms of competition in deliv-
ery of health care). Cf. ABA SPEcIAL COMMIrTEE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 126,
at i ("the [prepaid legal service antitrust] problem narrows down to those plans whose control is
vested in lawyers or designated representatives of an organized bar association").
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the UCRF system employed by a provider-dominated service plan is
subject to precisely the same objections as are FMCs' maximum fee
schedules: they preclude competitive developments, substituting weak
controls (if not totally ineffective or worse) for the robust controls that
would emerge from active competition among HMOs and insurer-
sponsored closed panels. 161 So understood, professionally-sponsored
prepayment plans, whatever the ostensible controls employed, are part
of the medical profession's long struggle to prevent the emergence of
innovations that serve the consumer's interest in cost containment.'
62
As such, a per se prohibition should be applied to all professionally
sponsored efforts to regulate professional fees. As the Supreme Court
stated in the Socony- Vacuum case,
[a]ny combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in
an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing
group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that
they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly inter-
fering with the free play of market forces. The Act places all such
schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our economy
against any degree of interference. Under the Sherman Act a combi-
nation formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price ... is illegal per se.
163
161. Professor Havighurst has termed the Blue Cross/Blue Shield organizational model "a
cartel of fee-for-service providers." Havighurst, supra note 16, at 775 n.171. See Hearings on
Competition, pt.2, at 1045 (statement of Professor Havighurst); H. SOMERS, & A. SOMERS, supra
note 9, at 296-97, 319, 324; Bodenheimer, Cummings & Harding, Capitalizing on Illness: The
Health Insurance Industry, 4 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 583, 586, 588, 591 (1974).
The Blue plans resemble FMCs in that they usually try to obtain advance approval of
provider groups to price discounts and other contract terms before issuing new policies. Blue
Shield negotiates directly with medical societies and Blue Cross with hospital groups. Other insur-
ers are not permitted to participate in these meetings and do not obtain the price discounts, any
more than they gain the benefit of the relatively low fee rates set by FMC plans. And so the Blues,
by maintaining their historically friendly relations with professional interest groups, continue to
hold a dominant position in the health insurance market while setting the price floor for medical
and hospital services. One would expect monstrous inefficiency in this system, and there is evi-
dence of it. See [1977] ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 816, at A-12 (in 1969, hospital
costs were 17% higher in areas where Blue Cross possessed monopoly power). In light of the
substantial market power wielded by Blue Shield, see What's Blue Shield Up to Now, Medical
Examiner, Sept. 6, 1976, at 92, 94 (covers 35% of U.S. population; 80% of American doctors par-
ticipate); [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 753, at A-9 (covers 90% of U.S.
population), and Blue Cross, see S. LAW, supra note 9, at 1-2 (disburses about one-half the total
money paid out for health care in America), it seems likely that competitive conditions will not
exist in the health care services industry until provider domination of the Blue plans is ended. Cf
Hearings on Competition, pt.2, at 1051 (statement of Professor Havighurst) (the Blue plans must be
removed from their preferred position vis-h-vis the commercial insurer in dealing directly with
doctors and hospitals before the commercials can effectively inaugurate cost controls).
162. See Note, he American Medical 4ssociatio " Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized
Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954).
163. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-22, 223 (1940).
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Because professionally sponsored schemes, unlike insurer-initiated cost
control programs, cannot claim dispensation under the ancillary re-
straint doctrine, Sherman Act principles, if applied, would condemn
them. Thus, the ultimate question becomes whether the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act shelters professionally established fee controls from antitrust
scrutiny.
VI. THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON EXEMPTION AND PROFESSIONALLY
SPONSORED FEE SCHEDULES
Despite their illegality under traditional antitrust analysis, FMCs
and other provider-dominated insurance plans may contend that they
are freed from antitrust scrutiny by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 164
The McCarran Act confers upon those engaged in the "business of in-
surance" a specific exemption from antitrust legislation to the extent
that such business is regulated by state law.165 The exemption does not
extend to predatory conduct arising from boycott, coercion or intimida-
tion.166 Thus, fee schedule agreements would be excluded from the Mc-
Carran Act's protective umbrella if their formation and terms are not
regulated by state law or if their implementation involves boycott, coer-
cion or intimidation. More fundamentally, however, recent federal case
law raises the question whether the "business of insurance" exemption
applies to professional fee schedules. This section of the Article will
discuss that case law and will conclude that the exemption should ap-
ply only to fee schedules imposed at the independent initiative of insur-
ers, and not to fee arrangements that are created at the behest of
providers of care, whether it be through provider sponsorship of the
plan or through medical society domination or influence over the insur-
ance plan.
Determining whether professional fee schedules fall within the
definition of the "business of insurance" involves a choice between
competing theories as to the proper scope of the McCarran Act exemp-
tion. Three possible definitions will be discussed here: first, the "busi-
ness of insurance" covers only the underwriting of risk and the
payment of indemnities, and not provision of products or services; sec-
ond, the "business of insurance" includes only activities peculiar to the
insurance industry; and finally, the "business of insurance" should be
defined under a flexible test that parallels the doctrinal and policy con-
siderations of the antitrust ancillarity principle. 167
164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
165. Id § 1012(b).
166. Id § 1013(b).
167. The definition of the phrase "business of insurance" as it is used in the McCarran Act is
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The Supreme Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co. 168 broadly defined the "business of insurance" as the underwriting
of risks in exchange for a premium. In a considerable narrowing of this
definition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Royal Drug recently
decided that the business of insurance comprehends indemnifying in-
sureds for their losses but does not include providing products and
services. 169 This ruling ran against the precedent of several district
court decisions 7 ° and appeared inconsistent with the leading Third
Circuit case of Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross.'7' The Royal
Drug court simply disapproved of the rationale behind the various dis-
trict court holdings. Taking particular aim at Manasen v. California
Dental Services,'72 a district court decision involving a prepaid dental
program, the court argued that services did not become transformed
into "insurance" solely because they have "an impact, favorable or
otherwise, upon premiums charged by the insurer."' 73 The court distin-
guished Travelers on the ground that that case had involved a unique
situation in which the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania had
a matter of federal statutory construction and should be decided by reference to federal law. In
Pastor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1976-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,783 (C.D. Cal. 1976), the
opposite position was adopted, the court holding that a commercial insurer was entitled to the
McCarran exemption from the antitrust laws because its activities were within the state of Califor-
nia's definition of insurance, but that the business of a county medical association, which was not
encompassed by the state's definition, was outside the protective scope of the McCarran Act. This
reasoning confuses the question of the meaning of "insurance" with the analytically separate
problem of defining the scope of a given state's regulation of insurance. The existence of state
regulation is a discrete requirement under the McCarran-Ferguson Act that should be kept sepa-
rate from the threshold issue of defining the business of insurance. The Supreme Court has explic-
itly stated in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959), that "the words
'insurance' and 'annuity' are federal terms" for McCarran Act purposes; lower courts should ad-
here to that rule and not inject confusion into this already complex area by intermixing the prob-
lem of defining insurance with the problem of interpreting the contours of state regulation.
168. 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
169. 556 F.2d at 1381-82. The facts are discussed at notes 117-18 supra and accompanying
text. The court's holding is less than clear, however, since in ruling that Blue Shield's drug plan
was not within the protection of the McCarran Act it also relied on the absence of state regulation
of the fee schedules involved, on the coercive aspects of the plan and on its effect as a horizontal,
anticompetitive restraint on prices.
170. See Manasen v. California Dental Serv., 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Proctor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975); Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Mich. 1973); California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co., 175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959). Two such decisions have been affirmed on appeal.
Anderson v. Medical Serv. of the Dist. of Columbia, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977); Frankford
Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977). See also Proctor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
171. 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
172. 424 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
173. Royal.Drug, 556 F.2d at 1386.
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exerted pressure on insurance companies to exercise their power over
hospitals to reduce hospital costs. Though Royal Drug did not cite
Parker v. Brown,'74 its interpretation of Travelers appears to follow
Parker's holding that the Sherman Act does not invalidate state regula-
tion of economic activity. The court reasoned that insofar as the state of
Pennsylvania, acting through its insurance commissioner, was regulat-
ing hospitals through the medium of insurance companies, the activi-
ties of those companies represented extensions of state activities and
therefore were not subject to the Sherman Act.'75
Whether Travelers can be fairly distinguished on state action
grounds or not, the fact remains that, with the exception of RoyalDrug,
the federal courts have uniformly refused to deny McCarran Act appli-
cation to activities of professional service plans merely because they
involve the delivery of products and services rather than simple indem-
nity. This approach is proper; the definition of "insurance" should not
turn mechanically on whether a given plan technically provides service
or indemnity. Many of the closed panel service plans supported by this
Article as procompetitive innovations in the health insurance industry
would be denied protection as insurance under this formalistic ap-
proach; a more flexible test is needed.
A second possible definitional formulation for the "business of in-
surance," also suggested in Royal Drug, is whether the activity in issue
is "peculiar to the insurance industry." '176 Under this definition, activi-
ties not unique to insurers would not qualify under the McCarran Act.
This notion draws some support from the legislative history of the Act.
Until 1944, insurance contracts were deemed outside the constitutional
reach of federal legislation because they did not concern interstate
commerce. When that doctrine was reversed by United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association,'77 Congress was suddenly faced with
the potentially chaotic intrusion of the Sherman Act into an area that
had traditionally been the special concern of the states. It reacted by
passing the McCarran Act. There is little dispute that the Act was
passed for the benefit of insurance companies and that Congress' con-
cept of "insurance" was that derived from the conventional gloss that
174. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-98 (1976)
(for state economic regulation to exempt business from Sherman Act, the regulation must be nar-
rowly defined, specific and necessary to the state's purpose).
175. See 556 F.2d at 1382-83. The Fifth Circuit derived support for this interpretation of
Travelers from Doctors' Hosp. v. Blue Cross, a Pennsylvania case later affirmed per curiam by the
Third Circuit. 360 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Pa. 1973), afl'dper curiam, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
176. 556 F.2d at 1383-84.
177. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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the term had acquired under state law.' 78
As in the case of the services-indemnity dichotomy, however, the
"peculiar to the insurance industry" test proves too much. It, too, indis-
criminately pulls within its sweep many insurer-initiated cost controls
that are procompetitive and that clearly relate to the terms of insurance
contract coverage. What is within the legitimate ambit of the insurance
industry must change with the needs of society; the service of cost con-
tainment may be a novel insurance activity, but it is also an activity
ideally suited to insurers-an activity that competitive forces, had they
been allowed to work freely in the health sector, might have produced
long before. Moreover, the "peculiar to the insurance industry" test ap-
pears to be narrower than that called for by the Supreme Court's lan-
guage in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,17 9 an important case
extensively relied upon in Royal Drug. i0 In National Securities, the
Court included within the "business of insurance" the "relationship be-
tween insurer and insured," the "type of policy which could be issued,
its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement," and "other activities
* , * [which] relate . ..to their status as reliable insurers."'' These
criteria are broad enough to embrace activities that noninsurers might
also be engaged in.
The definition of the "business of insurance" should be a flexible
test that accounts for the purposes of both the McCarran and the Sher-
man Acts. Congress did not intend by its passage of the McCarran Act
to unleash and protect anticompetitive activities that would normally
be proscribed by the Sherman Act any time that those activities can be
superficially characterized under the rubric of "insurance." On the
other hand, Congress certainly did not attempt to meticulously define
the limits of the insurance business, nor did it intend to freeze evolution
of the insurance industry as it existed at the Act's passage. It is perfectly
consonant with the purposes of the antitrust laws and the McCarran
Act to give antitrust exemption to insurer-initiated fee schedules when
insurers stand in a position basically antagonistic to providers and ne-
gotiate with providers solely to lower the costs at which they can offer
service to their subscribers. This type of cost-control activity is procom-
petitive-vindicating the purposes of the Sherman Act-and it en-
hances the insurance carriers' business, thereby aiding the very parties
178. As the Supreme Court has stated, "Congress was legislating concerning a concept which
had taken on its coloration and meaning largely from state law. ... SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959).
179. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
180. See 556 F.2d at 1380.
181. 393 U.S. at 460.
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that the McCarran Act was designed to protect. If there are indications
of monopsony power and its abuse, of course, the courts should give
even insurer-initiated fee controls close scrutiny.18 2
Fee schedules created by provider-dominated plans-either Blue
plans or separate provider-sponsored entities-call for the opposite re-
sult. Provider dominance, for reasons discussed at length earlier in this
Article, is inherently anticompetitive. Fee schedules fixed at the behest
of providers invariably form the basis for increases in prices and they
smack of blatant horizontal restraint. In the case of Blue plans, pro-
vider influence may have the effect of co-opting innovation by setting
up barriers to the entry of alternative delivery and pricing models.
This analysis is consistent with much of the tenor of the Royal
Drug opinion, though it would require a more searching treatment of
the competing factors than the Fifth Circuit undertook. The court in
that case found elements of coercion in the prepaid drug plan that Blue
Shield designed, and coercion, under the explicit language of the Mc-
Carran Act, would render an activity subject to antitrust scrutiny. The
court also appeared to be influenced by traces of horizontal combina-
tion in the record. When a horizontal agreement, of either an explicit or
"conscious parallelism" variety, coercion or other evidence of provider
overbearance is present, the Royal Drug result should be emulated.
Finally, it should be observed that this analysis of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act closely parallels the scope of the ancillarity doctrine pre-
viously discussed. Cost controls which are reasonably related to a legit-
imate commercial purpose and which are no more restrictive than
necessary to effectuate that purpose should be encouraged, not discour-
aged, by the antitrust laws. The parallel to the ancillarity doctrine sug-
gests a corollary to the McCarran Act analysis contained here: when a
less restrictive alternative is available to accomplish an insurer's cost
containment ends, that alternative should be required in order to gain
the McCarran Act's shelter. In the case of a closed-panel medical plan,
for example, subscribers should have the option of receiving care from
physicians not participating in the panel, to be reimbursed at a fixed
lesser percentage of that physician's charge. Alternatively, the sub-
scriber might be required to pay the nonparticipating physician the dif-
ference between his fee and the closed-panel fee; the physician would
then be directly reimbursed by the plan at the plan's normal fee rate.
These models would introduce price competition among providers and
therefore deserve judicial approval.
182. See notes 71 & 72 supra.
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Conceptually, of course, approval might come either by including
such plans within the "business of insurance" definition or by denying
McCarran Act protection, but recognizing the ancillarity argument as
an affirmative defense. Because antitrust principles would tolerate med-
ical care fee schedules introduced by commercial insurers whether or
not the schedules fall within the protective provisions of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, it is ultimately irrelevant to the legality of such schedules
whether the Royal Drug court was correct in refusing to consider them
the "business of insurance." Nonetheless, the court was probably
wrong in not recognizing cost control implemented through fee sched-
ules to be a legitimate part of the insurance business.
In sum, a sound definition of the McCarran Act's "business of in-
surance" would exempt fee schedules from antitrust scrutiny so long as
they are not provider-dominated plans. This definition effectuates the
purposes of both the McCarran Act and the Sherman Act, and en-
hances the laudable social goal of cost containment within the health
sector.
VII. RELATIVE VALUE SCHEDULES: A PERMISSIBLE APPROACH TO
HEALTH CARE COST CONTROL
A. Jhy Relative Value Schedules Are Desirable.
One issue which is vital to the development of insurer-initiated
cost control contracts is whether relative value schedules should be
condemned under the Sherman Act as price fixing instruments. The
relative value schedule is a price data dissemination device virtually
unique to the medical profession. 183 It compares the relative median
charge values of specified physician or hospital services as they are ac-
tually being charged in a discrete geographical area. Applying a mone-
tary conversion factor to the relative value of a given procedure
determines its price.18a
183. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 2. See also NATIONAL Asso-
CIATION OF BLUE SHIELD PLANS, supra note 2. Relative value schedules have been designed and
used primarily by physicians, but they seem equally desirable and viable in the hospital context.
See Kovener, Relative Value Scheduling: CF + 1, Hosp. ACCOUNTING, Sept. 1967, at 15.
The relative value device has been adopted by only one state bar association, that of Kan-
sas. See Corley & Arnould, supra note 43, at 22-26. Some persons have expressed interest in using
value guides more widely in pricing legal services. See generally Blaine, supra note 4. Use of a
relative value schedule by one bar-sponsored prepaid legal services plan has met antitrust opposi-
tion. See notes 131-36 supra and accompanying text.




Relative value schedules are desirable in the context of health care
cost control because they would be the basis for bargaining between
insurers and providers of care. They constitute a tool which has proven
effective in retarding medical care cost inflation.18 5 Insurers have al-
ready begun to rely upon these schedules in cost control programs z86
and it seems clear that they will have continuing incentive to design
and utilize accurate value scales in the future. By varying the conver-
sion factors according to a provider's expertise or technological capa-
bility with respect to particular services, the insured's willingness to pay
and its own claims-handling efficiency, an insurance company could
offer a wide variety of price-service packages to both subscribing con-
sumers and participating providers. For this reason, relative value
scales "provide a potential instrument for equitable and professionally
acceptable regulation of health care costs."' 87
It is important to note that relative value schedules, utilized in this
way, do not fix prices. Although relative value schedules serve some of
the desirable purposes supposedly attained by minimum fee schedules,
especially the dissemination of price information to new practitioners
and consumers,' 88 they are not fee schedules as such because no price is
fixed until a conversion factor is applied. Therefore, relative value
scales do not create the antitrust concerns which have arisen with re-
spect to the fee agreements that may ultimately be reached between
insurers and providers.
Nevertheless, the federal antitrust agencies have mounted a con-
centrated attack upon relative value schedules as they are currently be-
ing utilized by medical societies. The remaining parts of this section of
the Article will discuss that attack and demonstrate that the antitrust
objection applies to the promulgation and dissemination of value scales
by professional associations rather than to the scales themselves. It will
be concluded that the Sherman Act will not prohibit the use of relative
185. See HEW PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 6, at 34 (1976).
186. See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 6; Carlova, supra note 3, at
31, 36; Council on Wage and Price Stability, supra note 10, at 40, 317-18; cf. Egdahl, supra note
144, at 492, 495.
Insurers of professional services in foreign countries have also found fee schedules indispen-
sable in controlling costs. See Pfennigstorfl, LegalExpense Insurance, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 451,466
(1975).
187. H. SOMERs & A. SOMERs, supra note 9, at 424; see id at 55; Bibler, What Relative Value
Studies Mean to the General Practitioner, 1959 J. IND. ST. MED. A. 1340, 1344-45. Cf. Kovener,
supra note 183, at 17.
188. See Bibler, supra note 187, at 1345; Comment, Legal Fee Schedules: New York's
Approach, 24 BuFFALo L. REV. 839, 854 (1975); Note, A Critical Analysis OfBar Association
Minimum Fee Schedules, 85 HARv. L. REV. 971, 986-87 (1972).
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value studies by insurance firms for cost control purposes unless the
result is price uniformity.
B. Antitrust Attack on Medical Society-Deszgned Relative Value
Schedules The Trade Association Cases.
In the wake of the Goldfarb decision, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
of Justice have been vigorously attacking relative value schedules
promulgated by various medical societies.'89 The FTC has entered con-
sent agreements with several associations of health care professionals
abolishing the use of such schedules 9 ° or ordering the retraction of
previously issued schedules.191 Meanwhile, the Antitrust Division has
filed civil actions against other medical associations, charging them
with price fixing through the use of relative value schedules and seek-
ing to enjoin their further use.192 In the face of this antitrust pressure,
several state medical societies have voluntarily abandoned the use of
relative value scales. 19
3
The government has taken the position in these cases that the com-
pilation and promulgation of relative value guides by providers acting
in combination through their medical societies constitutes impermissi-
ble meddling with the medical service price structure. Apparently rec-
ognizing the important interests that relative value schedules can serve
when used appropriately, 94 the antitrust enforcement agencies have
189. See.Doctors andLawyers Fght the Madison Avenue Route, 8 NATIONAL J. 1144, 1147-48
(1976), summarizing the activities of the FTC and the Antitrust Division against restrictive prac-
tices of the medical industry. The FTC is particularly active in this area.
190. See Specialties Abandon Value Scales, Am. Med. News, July 26, 1976, at I, col. 4
(American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons and American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists). FTC consent orders do not require any admission of wrongdoing. See also [1977] ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 797, at A-10 (FTC has charged American Dental
Association with an illegal restraint of trade in violation of the FTC Act by preventing price
competition through its ethical codes; FTC asks for prohibition against publication or enforce-
ment by ADA of any agreement, ethics code or interpretation that would restrain competition
among dentists).
191. See MedicalAssociation in Minnesota Agrees to Bar on Fee Codes, Wall St. J., Apr. 21,
1977, at 14, col. 3 (Minnesota State Medical Association and 34 local medical societies); JRadiolo-
gists Accept FTC Order Barring Pricing Schedules, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1976, at 12, col. 3 (Ameri-
can College of Radiology).
192. United States v. Illinois Podiatry Soe'y, Inc., No. 77 C501 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 14,
1977), citedin [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 801, at A-25; United States v.
American Soe'y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., Civil No. 75-4640 (S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 22, 1975), cited
in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075, at 53,623. See also United States v. Alameda County
Veterinary Medical Ass'n, Civ. No. 75-2398-CBR (N.D. Cal, filed Aug. 8, 1977) cited in [1977]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 826, at A-10.
193. See Carlova, supra note 3, at 42.
194. See notes 63 & 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
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not sought to prevent individual physicians from using the schedules,
nor have they acted against third party groups which design and em-
ploy them.195 The goal, rather, is to prevent professional organizations
from interfering with the fee-setting practices of members. 196
The government seems to have taken the position in these cases
that medical associations should be regarded as trade associations for
antitrust purposes and that the principles derived from trade associa-
tion cases should be applied to the price determining activities of medi-
cal societies. This position makes sense in that medical associations,
like ordinary business trade associations, represent and act to further
the collective interests of the professional membership.197
Medical society compilation and updating of relative value sched-
ules resemble several forms of trade association price formula activities
which have been found subject to challenge as price fixing under the
Sherman Act.' 98 For example, "basing point" pricing-where an asso-
ciation gathers and publishes average production cost data and stan-
dard transportation rates' 99 or where it disseminates a price study
195. Some Blue plans use relative value scales in negotiating service plans with providers,
see note 185 supra.
196. See authorities cited in note 192 supra.
197. See Meeks 875-76, for analogous discussion of bar associations as trade associations.
The medical profession differs from many other trades because of the substantial market power,
bordering on monopoly power, which every doctor and hospital wields in dealing with the con-
suming public. See Hearings on Competition, pt.2, at 1039 & 1580-84; S. LAW, supra note 9, at 32-
33 & 38-41; Havighurst, HMO's 768-69; Kessel, supra note 60. Medicine is also distinguished
from other industries on the ground that concentration among doctors and hospitals is infrequent
except on a very local leveL Cf. Comment, BarAssociation Minimum Fee Schedules and the Ant-
trust Laws, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164, 1178.
Nevertheless, professional organizations in the health care sector resemble ordinary trade
associations in that they represent and act to further the collective interests of the professions.
Hospitals and medical societies do in fact powerfully reinforce and maintain the market power of
individual providers of care. See Havighurst, HMO's 768-69; Kessel, supra note 60; Kessel, The
A.MA4. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 267 (1970); Rayack, Restrictive
Practices of Organized Medicine, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 659 (1968); Comment, he American Medi-
calAssociatiorn Power, Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937 (1954). See
generally E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND ORGANIZED MEDICINE (1967). It has been sug-
gested that, in a subtle fashion, the very independence and power of their members makes these
organizations even more dangerous than traditional trade associations because anticompetitive
practices can be maintained within them with fewer formalities than is usually the case. Havig-
hurst, HAO's 768.
198. For recent discussions of case law on trade association pricing activities, see Kefauver,
The Legality of Dissemination fMarket Data by TradeAssociations." What Does Container Hold?,
57 CORNELL L. Rv. 777 (1972); Comment, supra note 197, at 1174-79; Note, Antitrust Im1plica-
tions of the Exchange oPrice Information Among Competitors.- The Container Corporation Case,
68 MICH. L. REv. 720 (1970).
199. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). In Maple
Flooring, the Supreme Court upheld the price reporting plan despite the fact that the association's
twenty-two members represented seventy-five percent of industry production, relying on the gov-
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matching the values of the different types or sizes of a complicated
product to a standard valuez°°  is unlawful under section one. Price
"manuals" that enable the individual seller to convert "fragmentary"
price data from his competitors into meaningful price statistics have
been held illegal.2 ' In general, any common costing method proposed
by a trade group and enforced by a system of penalties-and the penal-
ties may be as mild as "social pressures '  -raises antitrust
problems.20 3
The problems arise because price information activities of trade
associations tend, whatever their ostensible purpose, to promote price
uniformity.2° Due to the central and commanding market position oc-
cupied by a medical society,205 competing value scales are discouraged
and providers are exhorted by the social pressures of the profession to
design charges in accordance with the society's value schedule.20 6 The
compilation and presentation of these schedules at medical society
meetings facilitates the stabilization of prices because a provider can
pigeonhole his charge schedule by mentioning a couple of past charges
or by referring to his conversion factor20 7 and because an upward ad-
justment in the value of any service would result in an across-the-board
increase in its price.20 8 It might be difficult to prove at trial that prices
emment's failure to prove either an anticompetitive purpose or an actual restraint of trade. Id at
583-86. The case is hard to reconcile with subsequent decisions holding that purpose is irrelevant
and that illegal effect can be presumed from price information dissemination schemes in an oli-
gopoly setting. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Sugar Inst.,
Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). See also C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 232 (TNEC Monograph No. 21, 1941).
200. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 154-61, 173-77 (D.N.J. 1915),
afd, 251 U.S. 417 (1920); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 65, at 149.
201. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 336 (1969).
202. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (1921). See
note 206 infra and accompanying text.
203. See C. WILCOx, supra note 199, at 228 & 230. Professional codes of ethics can provide
a potent vehicle for subtly imposing such penalties. See id at 232. Cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975).
204. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1969).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Podiatry Soc'y, Inc., [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 801, at A-25 (N.D. Ill) (representing 60% of Illinois podiatrists); United
States v. American Soe'y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 45,075 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (representing 90% of American anesthesiologists). Cf. Meeks 878.
206. For an example of similar pressures to conform in trade organizations, see American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (1921) ("open competition" plan
designed by hardwood producers' association was unlawful where it ensured "harmony" of prices
through a system of "trade punishment" maintained by "social pressures").
207. See [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 803, at A-20, citing a statement
by an FTC spokesperson that relative value scales are suspect because they can easily be used to
set prices.
208. There is suspicion that the biases of medical society compilers tend to inflate the rela-
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are in fact illegally stabilized in these ways. But such proof may be
unnecessary because the courts will presume an illegal effect from the
mere flow of specific price information among competitors in an indus-
try possessing the competition-discouraging structural characteristics of
the medical profession,"0 9 such as inelastic demand l0 and high en-
trance requirements.1
The compilation of relative value data by medical societies offends
the Sherman Act because it requires the exchange of specific price in-
formation among competitors and tends to stabilize the prices of medi-
cal care in the affected community. Little would be lost and much
might be gained by forbidding this activity as per se illegal under the
Sherman Act. Providers will have to make charges with less sure
knowledge of the price structures utilized by other providers, but this
fact of life will improve competition, not defeat it. The sincerity and
accuracy of some professionally designed relative value studies would
be sacrificed, but equally reliable schedules can be drafted by compet-
ing insurers engaged in arm's length bargaining with providers of care.
Since no exigency appears which can justify professional participation
in preparing and promoting relative value schedules, 212 a rule con-
demning it seems appropriate.213
tive values of specific services upward. See Carlova, supra note 3, at 42; Edlund, supra note 64, at
800 (Blue Shield distrust of medical society committee designed value scales).
209. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). See United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-222 (1940); Note, supra note 198, at 727-28.
210. Where demand is inelastic-that is, where it does not diminish as prices rise and in-
crease as prices fall-a price reporting plan can be expected at best to yield stable, but not lower,
fees. C. WILCOX, supra note 199, at 229.
211. Where, as in the medical and hospital fields, entrance to the industry is limited by legal
impediments such as education and accreditation requirements or by the need for a large capital
investment, a reporting system can in itself "implement a price agreement, or promote price lead-
ership and facilitate the application of pressure against price cutters." Id
212. In the analogous field of lawyers' fees, the Antitrust Division has hesitated to bless bar
association-sponsored relative value studies even when prepared by an independent organization,
see notes 131-36 supra and accompanying text, and it has permitted bar involvement in fee setting
only as necessary to the inauguration of a consumer-controlled fee restrictive prepaid service plan,
see notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text. Even that much involvement is unnecessary in the
sphere of health care financing because of the years of actuarial fee data that insurance carriers
have accumulated and because of the relative value schedules which are already in use.
213. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1960), struck down an
agreement by the eighteen suppliers of 90% of America's corrugated cardboard boxes to furnish
each other, upon request, the most recent prices charged or quoted to a specific customer. The
record showed that such requests were infrequent and irregular, and there was little evidence of
anticompetitive purpose or effect. The case seemed to raise a presumption that the flow of specific
present price information in a structural oligopoly would lead to interdependent pricing. See
Kefauver, supra note 198, at 786-87. The Supreme Court used some per se language in the
Container case, 393 U.S. at 336-67, but its result was not reached by per se reasoning. See, e.g.,
Kefauver, supra note 198, at 784-87 & n.45, 791-92; Comment, supra note 197, at 1178 & n.91;
Note, supra note 198, at 730-32 & 737; c( United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86,
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C. Relative Value Schedules Designed by Insurers-A Permissible
Alternative.
The most practicable alternative to provider-promulgated relative
value schedules is to have third party payors design them.21 4 Insurers
can base the schedules on their own claims experience215 and, at least
113 (1975). Instead, the Court implied that a defense of justification, such as was raised success-
fully in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), could still be used to
legitimize price exchanges among competitors. See Container, 393 U.S. at 335.
In Cement Manufacturers, the Court upheld as an ancillary, reasonable restraint an ex-
change among cement manufacturers of "specific job contract" information including prices,
amounts and names of purchasers. Under such contracts, which were standard in the industry, the
contractor got an option to purchase at a stated price all the cement he needed for a specific job;
the price would follow the market if it declined but the supplier was bound if it rose. The Court
agreed with the defendants that the data exchange was justified by the need of manufacturers to
protect themselves from the fraudulent practice of some contractors who would purchase at a low
price much more cement than was needed for a specific job, then use it on other jobs. Id at 594-
96. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 123 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S.Ct. 52 (1977); Webster v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 338 F. Supp. 248, 250-51 (S.D. Ala.
1971).
No such justification seems likely to arise in the health insurance market. Insurer-provider
contracts will probably be of one or more years in duration, so as to assure stability, rather than
handled on a "job" basis. Providers will have numerous fee proposals, offered by competing insur-
ers, from which to choose. Therefore "fraudulent" behavior by insurers negotiating for low fees
does not promise to be a problem.
214. Other alternatives would include having a government agency design the value scales,
or engaging an independent outside organization to do so. There is, of course, currently no gov-
ernment agency with the authority and interest to collect medical and hospital fee data and com-
pile a relative value statistical study. HEW has some expertise in this area due to its studies of
relative value schedules; Health Systems Agencies would be another candidate for the job due to
their local practice orientation. To undertake such a task would be an ongoing, expensive and
time-consuming proposition, for it would entail continuous review of the costs and historical price
structure of a multitude of practice communities nationwide. The primary advantage of a govern-
mentally conducted relative value study would be, in theory at least, its objectivity. But both
insurers and providers of care might understandably object to this additional intrusion of the
regulatory bureaucracy into their affairs. More importantly, the governmental approach would
result in only one relative value scale in each market area, thus perpetuating that lack of diversity
which is thought to be one of the chief failings of the present system of professionally designed
scales.
The private, independent organization approach to conducting relative value studies seems
less workable even than the governmental approach. If the organization were engaged by either
provider or insurer interests, the cost might be greater than if the interested party had conducted
the study itself, and the fear of bias would still be present.
215. See note 182 supra and accompanying text. Apparently the Blues have had this capabil-
ity for years, see note 121 supra, but sometimes merely in the role of an ersatz medical society, see
Edlund, supra note 208. Others have apparently had success working with providers and with
computerized claims data to prepare fee schedules for company use. See Pettengill, No Pefect
Plan, 9 TRIAL 21, 22 (Mar./Apr. 1973) (Aetna Casualty and Insurance Co.). Cf Edlund, supra
note 208, at 800 (suggesting that insurers could design a more practical, actuarially-oriented rela-
tive value schedule than providers, interested simply in setting a fee, have done). See also Rosen-
berg, supra note 23, at 33, 36 (Aetna Life & Casualty Co. was apparently able to develop
computerized fee proffles for cost control purposes in 1972 from medical society relative value
studies and its own records of providers' past charges). But see Bailey, supra note 24, at 609;
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initially, on relative value studies previously made by medical associa-
tions.216 They can count on participating providers to help keep the
schedules up to date by advising them of areas where old records are
out of line with current costs. An insurer could ensure the accuracy of
its schedule and any requested cost increases by comparing cost charges
suggested by providers in one community with those reported in other
areas in which it does business.
Insurer-designed relative value schedules would escape the anti-
trust problems posed by medical society-sponsored schedules because
they would be diverse. Since each insurance firm would have its own
relative value guide based upon its own claims history, the problems
posed by price data exchanges among competitors would not arise.
Moreover, an insurer might well apply varying conversion factors to its
schedule in making fee arrangements with different providers of care.
Hence, one would not expect the schedules to result in uniformity of
prices. If excessive uniformity did in fact result, this would of course be
cause for antitrust concern, but that concern would focus not upon the
relative value schedule as a price fixing device but upon its improper
manipulation for the purpose of price fixing by a combination of insur-
ers or providers or upon its unlawful use by a monopsonist insurer.
Nor, as utilized by individual insurers as a means of setting fees in
contracts with individual providers, should relative value schedules be
held to offend the prohibition against price fixing. Such contractual ar-
rangements can be saved under the ancillarity doctrine, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act or the rules relating to maximum fee restraints discussed
above.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Commercial insurance companies, when challenged to play a
more aggressive role in containing the rising costs of medical care by
negotiating fee controls with providers, have responded that the anti-
trust laws will preclude them from doing so unless a specific legislative
dispensation is made.217 This Article has demonstrated that no such
Carlova, supra note 3, at 35, 36; "hat Price Health Care? The Problem of Cost Containment, supra
note 24, at 42, 43.
216. For this purpose, the discarded relative value studies of medical associations would
constitute "purely advisory guidelines" not restraining trade within the meaning of Goldfarb. See
notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Cohen, State Rate Regulation, in CONFERENCE ON
REGULATION IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY OF THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONTROLS ON HEALTH CARE 123, 129 (1975) (head of Mary-
land's hospital rate-setting commission uses relative value schedules in setting initial rates but may
not need a schedule after that).
217. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 24, at 609; What Price Health Care? The Problem of Cost
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exemption is necessary. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, properly con-
strued, already shields fee agreements between individual insurers and
individual providers from Sherman Act scrutiny. Even if the McCarran
legislation were read so as not to exempt such agreements, traditional
antitrust principles relating to maximum fee schedules and ancillary
restraints of trade would encourage, rather than denounce, insurer-pro-
vider cost control contracts. What neither the McCarran Act nor anti-
trust doctrine should be held to allow is the participation of organized
medicine or other provider groups in the design and negotiation of
these contracts. With the air cleared of anxiety about Sherman Act im-
plications, it is urged that the commercial insurance industry act, before
overly-hasty regulation of the health services market prevents it, to
show that private third party payors can put controls on medical costs
and in so doing benefit not only themselves but the nation.
Containment, supra note 24, at 41-43. Cf. Hearings on the Commercial Health andAccident Insur-
ance Industry Before the Subcomna on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1304 (1972); id, pt. 2, at 170 (Senator Kennedy offers
antitrust exemption to enable insurers to combine to exert leverage on medical profession to force
cost controls).
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